Statement issued by Human Rights Watch, Sep. 28, 2016
(New York) – Security forces in Bangladesh are deliberately shooting members and supporters of opposition parties in the leg, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. Victims explained that police shot them in custody and then falsely claimed that they were shot in self-defense, in crossfire with armed criminals, or during violent protests.
“Security forces in Bangladesh have long killed detainees in fake ‘crossfire killings,’ pretending the victim was killed when the authorities took him back to the scene of the crime and were attacked by one of his accomplices,” said Brad Adams, Asia director. “Now they’re adopting tactics similar to those once used by the Irish Republican Army and engaging in ‘kneecappings’ of people they have arrested, apparently because they belong to or support an opposition party.”
The 45-page report, “‘No Right to Live’: ‘Kneecapping’ and Maiming of Detainees by Bangladesh Security Forces,” calls upon Bangladesh authorities to order prompt, impartial, and independent investigations into all alleged “kneecappings” and other deliberate infliction of serious injuries by members of the security forces. The government should also invite the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and UN special rapporteurs on torture and extrajudicial executions to investigate “kneecappings” and other alleged acts of torture and make appropriate recommendations to ensure justice, accountability, and security force reform.
The report includes evidence from 25 individuals, mostly members and supporters of the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami, who said that police shot them in the leg without provocation. Several of the victims are permanently disabled, including some who had their legs amputated after being shot. Many described being beaten before being shot.
Most victims were unwilling to be identified, fearing arbitrary arrest, disappearance, torture, or extrajudicial killing – abuses that are all too common in Bangladesh, particularly against opposition party members. Others fear legal retribution, as almost all are facing criminal cases. In two cases involving members of the media, the victims were willing to be identified in the report. Mahbub Kabir, who worked in the marketing department of the pro-Jamaat daily Naya Diganta, was captured and shot in front of witnesses, but the police later filed criminal cases against him. According to Mahbub Kabir, the officer who shot him later threatened him, saying, “I have shot in your leg. If you speak out, then next time I will shoot in your eyes.”
Akram (pseudonym), a 32-year-old farmer, said that a police officer deliberately shot him in the leg after a raid in Chittagong: “After beating me for a few minutes, the police tied me to a tree. Then [a police officer] shot me above the knee in my left leg.” The officer, while denying the allegation, told a Bangladesh human rights organization that a dangerous criminal like Akram had “no right to live.” Admitting that he shot another criminal suspect in Chittagong a few months later during an alleged armed exchange, he acknowledged the culture of extrajudicial killings in Bangladesh, saying: “[The suspect] is still alive because he was arrested by the police. If the RAB [Rapid Action Battalion] or any other law enforcement agencies caught him, he would have been dead.”
“Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has said that she has ‘zero tolerance’ for extrajudicial killings or violence, but the fact that these abuses have only gotten worse since she came to power in 2009 makes it seem her government has infinite tolerance for state-sanctioned violence,” Adams said.
“Kneecappings” appear to have started after violent street protests in early 2013. The protests followed the domestic International Crimes Tribunal sentencing of Delwar Hossain Sayedee to death for war crimes during Bangladesh’s 1971 war of independence from Pakistan. Violence broke out again in the months preceding the January 2014 general elections when opposition supporters used petrol bombs and targeted the public to enforce strikes and economic blockades. Security forces responded fiercely, targeting both protesters and bystanders. Human Rights Watch documented many cases of arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings during this period and since.
Activists say they believe Bangladesh authorities adopted the practice of “kneecapping” in part to dissuade people from participating in street protests.
“Instead of issuing a knee-jerk denial of these claims, the government should ask the United Nations for expert assistance and ensure that perpetrators are prosecuted,” said Adams. “Sheikh Hasina needs to make it clear that Bangladesh security forces cannot get away with killing and maiming citizens simply because they support the wrong political party.”Human Rights Watch said that security officials are often under enormous pressure to prevent violence in demonstrations. However, they still have the responsibility to act within domestic and international law. Bangladesh is obliged to ensure that no one is subjected to torture, and that in the adjudication of a criminal charge, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing by a tribunal established by law, and presumed innocent until proven guilty. While Human Rights Watch is not in a position in every case to confirm or reject police claims that the victims were shot in self-defense or in crossfire during violent protests, all of the cases warrant rigorous, independent investigation and, as appropriate, criminal prosecution of the responsible police officers and commanders.
Selected Accounts
“One of the policemen was talking on his cellphone and asking a person on the other end whether they should injure or kill me. After he finished talking, the other police officers pushed me face down on the ground and shot me in my left leg. Then they put me back in the van and took me to hospital.”
-Alam, 35, shot in September 2015
“I just named two of my friends because I wanted the beating to stop. Then we stopped at a field and they blindfolded me. I had no idea what they were doing and I was shouting. They pushed me on the ground. And then they shot me. I was conscious. I heard one of them say, ‘Shoot again.’ Then another person said, ‘No need.’”
-Hyder, 20, shot in March 2015
“A policeman put me into handcuffs and brought me out and made me stand. He then went behind me and shot me in my left leg. I must have fallen unconscious, because the next thing is that I found myself lying on a bed at National Institute of Traumatology and Orthopaedic Rehabilitation. Four days later, my left leg was amputated.”
-Anis, 45, shot in February 2013
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Thursday, September 29, 2016
Wednesday, September 28, 2016
A dirty and expensive coal plant
By Shahzad Uddin, Professor of Accounting, University of Essex
September 27, 2016 / The Conversation, US
A controversial new coal power plant being built in Bangladesh is already running out of friends. Environmentalists worry it will spell disaster for the world’s largest mangrove forest, while locals worry about pollution and being driven from their homes. The vast majority of Bangladeshis have been critical of the project since its inception in 2010. Even the business case seems to be falling apart, as costs mount and international investors pull out. So why is it still being built?
Rampal, a 1320MW coal power station, will be big enough to provide around 10% of the country’s electricity generation. It’s scheduled to be operational from 2020. The project is owned jointly by Bangladesh and India’s state-owned energy utilities, which each have 15% equity, while the remaining 70% of the total funding is expected to come from bank loans.
The first and most obvious problem with Rampal is its location on the edge of the Sundarbans, a large, dense mangrove forest that straddles the Bangladesh-India border. The forest is a UNESCO world heritage site and hosts endangered species such as river dolphins and Bengal tigers which will see their habitat damaged if the plant becomes a reality.
Environmental groups claim the outer edge of the project is within a 14km radius of the forest, thereby breaking Bangladeshi forest laws. Each year, nearly 5m tonnes of coal will have to be shipped to the plant along the Poshur River, which cuts across the Sundarbans and will need to be dredged. There is a real danger of coal-carrying vehicles scattering large amounts of fly ash, coal dust, sulphur and other toxic chemicals.
Reports by NGO network Banktracks, anti-coal think-tank IEEFA and UNESCO claim the project takes no account of the potential for industrial accidents, transportation incidents, tidal waves and regular cyclones.
Human rights agencies have also raised concerns about the displacement of families and the occupation of land in adjacent areas. Fishermen, woodcutters and honey collectors have already lost their livelihoods as a result of displacement and encroachments onto their lands.
The above concerns are further compounded by the proposed technological and risk management plans. The plant is set to use outdated supercritical (SC) technology, which skips the water-boiling phase of conventional coal-fired generation but has since been superseded by the more modern and efficient “ultra-supercritical” (USC). Contrary to the claims of the Bangladeshi government, this is bound to produce high levels of carbon dioxide and waste-water discharges. It is also likely that Rampal will in fact be run using poor quality coal imported from India, which spits out lots of ash without creating much energy.
A Banktrack report suggests that the project fails to comply with even the minimum environmental and social norms established under the “Equator Principles”, which more than 80 major international financial institutions have signed up to. Consequently foreign banks have shown no interest in financing the project.
Given this, the Indian government arranged financing through its state-owned EXIM Bank at an effective interest rate of 5.2%. That’s much lower than market rates in India. However it’s still not an attractive deal for Bangladesh which could usually get a better rate from one of its “development partners” – richer countries such as Norway or Japanwhich have built close ties with the country.
Nevertheless, this is not a project in which development partners in Bangladesh are prepared to invest. The Norwegian Pension Fund, for instance, the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, pulled out citing serious environmental and human rights concerns.
The cheap loan below the market rate means the Indian taxpayer is effectively due to pay US$988m throughout the project, while the Bangladeshi taxpayer will pay even more: US$936m in tax breaks and US$1.87 billion for river dredging throughout the project.
In order to recover the subsidies and costs, the Rampal power plant will require a standard tariff of Tk9.54/kWh (US12.1c/kWh). Environmentalists claim that alternative power sources, such as solar panels, cost much less than this. This tariff may even be an underestimate, given it is based on the plant operating at 85% capacity (when a Chinese coal plant typically operates at 50-60%) and doesn’t account for the coal market. Rampal electricity would become even more costly if coal prices rose.
Rampal faces national and international resistance, and overwhelming financial and environmental concerns. So why are the ruling regime of Bangladesh and the Indian government continuing to push for the project?
Many Bangladeshis are wondering whether the Rampal project will open up markets for low-energy Indian coal, and whether this might be used as a political tool by an Indian government seeking influence in its neighbour. Whatever the consequences for future regional politics, this project will not only cause environmental and human rights disasters, but is also destined to create a financial nightmare for Bangladesh.
September 27, 2016 / The Conversation, US
A controversial new coal power plant being built in Bangladesh is already running out of friends. Environmentalists worry it will spell disaster for the world’s largest mangrove forest, while locals worry about pollution and being driven from their homes. The vast majority of Bangladeshis have been critical of the project since its inception in 2010. Even the business case seems to be falling apart, as costs mount and international investors pull out. So why is it still being built?
Rampal, a 1320MW coal power station, will be big enough to provide around 10% of the country’s electricity generation. It’s scheduled to be operational from 2020. The project is owned jointly by Bangladesh and India’s state-owned energy utilities, which each have 15% equity, while the remaining 70% of the total funding is expected to come from bank loans.
The first and most obvious problem with Rampal is its location on the edge of the Sundarbans, a large, dense mangrove forest that straddles the Bangladesh-India border. The forest is a UNESCO world heritage site and hosts endangered species such as river dolphins and Bengal tigers which will see their habitat damaged if the plant becomes a reality.
Environmental groups claim the outer edge of the project is within a 14km radius of the forest, thereby breaking Bangladeshi forest laws. Each year, nearly 5m tonnes of coal will have to be shipped to the plant along the Poshur River, which cuts across the Sundarbans and will need to be dredged. There is a real danger of coal-carrying vehicles scattering large amounts of fly ash, coal dust, sulphur and other toxic chemicals.
Reports by NGO network Banktracks, anti-coal think-tank IEEFA and UNESCO claim the project takes no account of the potential for industrial accidents, transportation incidents, tidal waves and regular cyclones.
Human rights agencies have also raised concerns about the displacement of families and the occupation of land in adjacent areas. Fishermen, woodcutters and honey collectors have already lost their livelihoods as a result of displacement and encroachments onto their lands.
The above concerns are further compounded by the proposed technological and risk management plans. The plant is set to use outdated supercritical (SC) technology, which skips the water-boiling phase of conventional coal-fired generation but has since been superseded by the more modern and efficient “ultra-supercritical” (USC). Contrary to the claims of the Bangladeshi government, this is bound to produce high levels of carbon dioxide and waste-water discharges. It is also likely that Rampal will in fact be run using poor quality coal imported from India, which spits out lots of ash without creating much energy.
A Banktrack report suggests that the project fails to comply with even the minimum environmental and social norms established under the “Equator Principles”, which more than 80 major international financial institutions have signed up to. Consequently foreign banks have shown no interest in financing the project.
Given this, the Indian government arranged financing through its state-owned EXIM Bank at an effective interest rate of 5.2%. That’s much lower than market rates in India. However it’s still not an attractive deal for Bangladesh which could usually get a better rate from one of its “development partners” – richer countries such as Norway or Japanwhich have built close ties with the country.
Nevertheless, this is not a project in which development partners in Bangladesh are prepared to invest. The Norwegian Pension Fund, for instance, the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, pulled out citing serious environmental and human rights concerns.
The cheap loan below the market rate means the Indian taxpayer is effectively due to pay US$988m throughout the project, while the Bangladeshi taxpayer will pay even more: US$936m in tax breaks and US$1.87 billion for river dredging throughout the project.
In order to recover the subsidies and costs, the Rampal power plant will require a standard tariff of Tk9.54/kWh (US12.1c/kWh). Environmentalists claim that alternative power sources, such as solar panels, cost much less than this. This tariff may even be an underestimate, given it is based on the plant operating at 85% capacity (when a Chinese coal plant typically operates at 50-60%) and doesn’t account for the coal market. Rampal electricity would become even more costly if coal prices rose.
Rampal faces national and international resistance, and overwhelming financial and environmental concerns. So why are the ruling regime of Bangladesh and the Indian government continuing to push for the project?
Many Bangladeshis are wondering whether the Rampal project will open up markets for low-energy Indian coal, and whether this might be used as a political tool by an Indian government seeking influence in its neighbour. Whatever the consequences for future regional politics, this project will not only cause environmental and human rights disasters, but is also destined to create a financial nightmare for Bangladesh.
Saturday, September 24, 2016
Bangladesh’s missing millions
Failure to publish a report stokes a bank-heist scandal
The government claims releasing the report would undermine efforts to retrieve the money
Sep 23rd 2016 | DHAKA | THE ECONOMIST
THIS week Bangladesh’s government was scheduled to make public the findings of a probe into one of the most spectacular robberies in modern times: the attempted theft in February of nearly $1 billion from accounts of Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, that were held at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In the end, the government chose to keep the report under wraps. On September 21st, a day before the planned release, A.M.A. Muhith, the finance minister, postponed its publication. Mr Muhith said making it public now would undermine efforts to retrieve the $81m that is still missing. Much of the money the thieves managed to prise from Bangladesh Bank ended up in the Philippines. The government is seeking to get it back through negotiation or legal action.
On September 19th a regional court in the Philippines ordered the country’s central bank, which had received a portion of the stolen money, to return $15m. The money is yet to make it to Dhaka; the Bangladeshi government is keen to retrieve the rest from the financial underbelly of the Philippines (much of it flowed through casinos in Manila). The country’s president, Rodrigo Duterte, has promised to help.
The word in Dhaka is that the report was kicked into the long grass because it hinted at a link between Bangladesh Bank employees and the hackers. This is indeed what the report, submitted to Mr Muhith’s ministry in May, had suggested. Yet the finance ministry has consistently blamed outsiders: hackers, the New York Fed and SWIFT, the messaging network for cross-border payments on which the transactions took place.
Since the heist became public knowledge through media reports in the Philippines, nearly a month after it happened, two theories have been suggested to explain how the thieves managed to send the New York Fed 35 properly authenticated SWIFT transfer orders. (The Fed executed five, leading to a transfer out of Bangladesh Bank accounts of $101m to the Philippines and Sri Lanka; officials have been able to claw back $20m from the latter.)
The first holds that it was possible to hack into the SWIFT systems at Bangladesh Bank and issue transfer orders without the physical presence of a person inside the central bank. Few find this credible. If it turns out to be possible, it would be worrying for the global payments system: SWIFT covers half of all big cross-border transfers. To issue transfer orders via SWIFT, tight security protocols must be followed, including possession of a physical key (a so-called dongle) to authorise transfer orders, long passwords and biometric access control.
The other view—not favoured by the finance ministry or Bangladesh Bank—holds that physical presence at the SWIFT terminals within Bangladesh Bank was required to issue the transfer orders and that the heist must therefore have been at least partly an inside job: a collaboration of hackers and central-bank employees or other individuals who had access to the central bank’s terminals.
This is the line of inquiry that Bangladesh’s sleuths are pursuing while the politicians stonewall. Bangladesh police’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) reckons SWIFT staff or consultants who installed the central bank’s systems had a hand in the theft (or were at least negligent); SWIFT denies this. The CID’s attempts to arrange a tête-à-tête in Dhaka with these individuals—Indian and Sri Lankan nationals—have been unsuccessful. The search for the elusive robbers continues.
Wednesday, September 21, 2016
Human Rights Watch: Status of women
Consideration of Bangladesh’s Periodic Report, 65th Session [Excerpted from report; footnotes excluded]
Human Rights Watch welcomes the opportunity to provide input drawn from our research on Bangladesh’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
A. Marriage Rights (Article 16 and 13a)
Bangladesh has the highest rate of child marriage in Asia, with a particularly shocking number of girls marrying before the age of 15. The prevalence of child marriage has devastating consequences for individual girls, their families, and Bangladesh’s development as a whole.
Child Marriage
Between 2005 and 2013, 29 percent of girls in Bangladesh married before the age of 15 and 65 percent married before the age of 18.[1] Despite a commitment by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2014 to end child marriage under age 15 by 2021 and to end child marriage under age 18 by 2041, the government has made little progress in reducing child marriage and has backtracked on these commitments in a destructive manner by seeking to create changes in the law that would effectively lower the age of marriage for girls from 18 to 16[2]
Causes and Consequences
Gender discrimination feeds social attitudes and customs that harm girls at every stage of their lives and fuel the country’s extremely high rate of child marriage. Desperate poverty remains a daily reality for many families in Bangladesh, and many parents see child marriage as their best option to safeguard the future of a daughter they feel they can neither feed nor educate nor protect. Bangladesh’s status as one of the countries in the world most affected by natural disasters and climate change adds an additional element of hardship to many families, especially those living in the most marginal and disaster-affected parts of the country.[3] In many of the villages Human Rights Watch visited in the course of researching the report Marry Before Your House is Swept Away, child marriage is not only socially acceptable but also expected.
Child marriage around the world is associated with many harmful consequences, including health dangers associated with early pregnancy, lower educational achievement for girls who marry earlier, a higher incidence of spousal violence, and an increased likelihood of poverty.[4] Research shows that pregnant girls aged 10-14 are five times more likely to die during delivery than mothers aged 20-24; girls aged 15-19 are still twice as likely to die during delivery than women aged 20-24.[5] A study across 7 countries found that girls who married before the age of 15 were more likely to experience spousal abuse than women who married after the age of 25.[6] Global data shows that girls from the poorest 20 percent of families are twice as likely to marry before 18 as girls whose families are among the richest 20 percent.[7]
Inadequate Government Response
At the July 2014 Girls Summit in London, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina committed to end marriage for girls under 15 and reduce by more than one-third the number of girls between the ages of 15 and 18 who marry by 2021. She further pledged to end all child marriages before the age of 18. The legal age of marriage in Bangladesh is currently 18 for women and 21 for men, but the law is weak, outdated, rarely enforced, and widely ignored.[8] As part of this effort, the prime minister pledged that her government would: 1) reform Bangladesh’s law which prohibits child marriage, the Child Marriage Restraint Act (CMRA) before 2015; 2) develop a national plan of action on ending child marriage by the end of 2014; and 3) take other steps to change social norms and engage civil society in the fight against child marriage.[9] But within weeks of pledging to end child marriage, Sheikh Hasina’s government proposed new legislation to lower the age of child marriage to 16.[10] Subsequent drafts of the proposed changes to the law have retained 18 as the age of marriage for girls, but proposed sweeping exceptions to that minimum, for example permitting marriage from 16 on with parental consent, that would constitute a de facto lowering of the age of marriage. Amid fierce opposition from activists and international partners to the proposed change in the age of marriage, the government’s effort to develop a national plan of action on ending child marriage has stalled, as has the process of reforming the law.
Addressing these issues can be complicated, but as long as the government looks the other way, or even facilitates child marriage, for example, when local government officials provide forged birth certificates,[11] marrying off young daughters will be a survival strategy for parents who feel unable to care for their children or succumb to social pressures to marry their daughters off early.
Discriminatory Personal Laws
About 330,000 women in Bangladesh are divorced, according to government data, and an unknown number live separated from husbands.[12] Rather than offer equal protection, Bangladesh’s discriminatory personal laws often trap women in abusive marriages or propel many of them into poverty when marriages fall apart. As we documented in our report, Will I Get My Dues…Before I Die? especially for poor women, discriminatory personal laws contribute to homelessness, hunger, and ill health for those divorced or separated and their dependents.[13] ......
Lack of Marital Property Rights
Despite the significant contributions that Bangladeshi women make to their marital households and assets, Bangladesh has no legal regime governing marital property. The 2010 law against domestic violence fills this legal gap to some extent. It gives a victim of domestic violence the right to reside in a “shared residence.”[20] The law also treats acts that cause “economic loss” as domestic violence. These include cases where a man refuses to let his wife enjoy or use properties and facilities that she is entitled to use because of her family relationship, denies her daily necessities, or deprives her of gifts she received during marriage.[21] However, apart from these protections in the law against domestic violence, neither civil laws nor personal laws in Bangladesh recognize, define, or set out rules for control over marital property during marriage or the division of marital property on an equal basis between spouses upon divorce.
Married women make contributions in many forms to family homes, businesses, fields, and other assets, providing vastly more unpaid household and caregiving labor than men. All married women whom Human Rights Watch interviewed for the report Will I Get My Dues…Before I Die? bore almost sole responsibility for household work, including cooking, cleaning, washing, grazing livestock, and fetching water. Many said they contributed significantly financially to their households at the time of, or during, marriage to their husbands to aid in their education and careers. Almost all women said they gave their husband or in-laws a dowry. Yet despite these myriad contributions, all but a handful of the women told Human Rights Watch they were unable to exercise control over their income and marital property. Nor were they able to recoup anything or have their economic value recognized when their marriages ended.
Most divorced or separated women described severe economic hardship, including losing marital homes, living on the street, begging for food, working as live-in domestics to have a roof over their heads, pulling children from school to work, struggling with ill health, and lacking resources to deal with any of these problems.[22]
Courtroom Battles and Social Assistance
Bangladesh established specialized family courts that deal with separation, divorce, and maintenance cases. But courts are so plagued with obstacles to timely maintenance, such as delays, dysfunction, and burdensome procedures, that women wait months or years for any result. Some women even face harassing counter-suits by husbands. Human Rights Watch’s research found that there are significant barriers to, and shortcomings in, Bangladesh’s social assistance programs, which fail to reach many women in extreme economic hardship after separation or divorce, and they fail to address women’s multiple vulnerabilities such as disability, ill-health, old age, and marital breakdown.
Labor Rights (Article 11)
In the past five years, two major disasters have taken numerous lives, many of them of women working in garment factories, at Rana Plaza and Tazreen. Garments account for almost 80 percent of the country’s export earnings and contribute more than 10 percent of GDP.[23] Industry growth drives Bangladesh’s economic boom, but it should not come at the price of the safety and health of workers.
Garment Work
80 percent of garment workers in Bangladesh are women.[24] A recent Human Rights Watch Report, Whoever Raises Their Head Suffers the Most found factories expose women to abuse, unsafe conditions, discrimination when it comes to wages and maternity leave, and anti-union tactics by employers, including assaults on union organizers. [25] More than 1,100 workers died in the catastrophic Rana Plaza collapse on April 24, 2013 and efforts are underway to make Bangladesh factories safer, but the government and Western retailers can and should do more to enforce international labor standards to protect workers’ rights, including their right to form unions and advocate for better conditions.[26]
Abuse
Workers report violations including physical assault, verbal abuse, forced overtime, denial of paid maternity leave, and failure to pay wages and bonuses on time or in full. The vast majority of garment workers are women, while supervisors and managers are mostly men, and sometimes the verbal abuse of women workers is of a sexual nature.[27] In 2009, the Bangladesh High Court issued strong guidelines to prevent and respond to sexual harassment at the workplace, which have yet to be systematically implemented.
Barriers to Forming Unions
While Bangladesh has changed some labor laws, including provisions to ease and facilitate the union registration process, there are significant legal barriers to forming unions, which have yet to be amended.[28] In practice, even though there has been a growth in the number of unions registered since 2013, labor authorities have arbitrarily rejected registration applications of newly formed unions.[29] Union leaders told Human Rights Watch that they continue to be targeted by threats, intimidation, and sometimes physical assault at the hands of factory management or hired third parties. In some factories, workers leading efforts to form unions have been dismissed for their organizing activities.
The Bangladesh government’s mechanism for investigating unfair labor practices is opaque and lacks process—workers who complain are not even assured the right to be heard during the investigations and the outcomes of complaints and action taken remains unknown.
Education (Article 10)
Girls in Bangladesh have made tremendous strides in education. For example, the UN notes that in 2013 Bangladesh had achieved gender parity in primary school enrolment.[30]However, obstacles remain to achieving total participation of girls in school throughout their education. Some of these obstacles include child marriage, indirect costs that burden poor families, distance to school, lack of water and sanitation facilities and sanitary supplies in schools, and sexual harassment of girls on the way to school and at school.
Exclusion of Girls
Lack of access to education is both a cause and a consequence of child marriage in Bangladesh. The link between access to education and child marriage is borne out by research finding that in Bangladesh women with primary, secondary, and higher education were respectively 24 percent, 72 percent, and 94 percent less likely to marry at a young age compared to women with no formal education.[31] Children that are out of school also often end up in the worst forms of labor.
While Bangladesh has made progress in abolishing school fees, students face associated costs for notebooks, pens, paper, textbooks, uniforms, transportation, and tutoring which put education out of reach for many poor families. Many married girls and their families interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had to leave school, often because of costs associated with education, and once they were out of school they were expected to marry or work. For others, a child marriage was the cause of them dropping out; when girls leave school to marry, schools do not intervene.
Other factors pushing girls out of school, especially as they reach secondary school age, include long distances to school in some areas, and unchecked sexual harassment of girls by men and boys on their way to school.
A lack of private toilets and sanitary supplies are also a factor in some girls’ absence from school. This makes it more difficult for girls to manage as they reach the onset of menstruation, when they become particularly likely to miss school. A study found that 40 percent of girls reported missing school during menstruation for an average of three school days each menstrual cycle.[32] In this study, 82 percent of girls said their school facilities were not appropriate for managing menstrual hygiene, only 12 percent had access to female-only toilets with water and soap available, and only 3 percent said the toilet they used had a trash bin.[33] Gaps in attendance caused by a lack of sanitation and care for menstrual hygiene also compromise girls’ eligibility for government stipends linked to attendance, cause girls to fall behind in their studies, and undermine parental support for keeping girls in school.[34]
Protecting Students, Teachers, and Schools
As detailed by the Committee in its concept note for its 2014 discussion on girls’ and women’s right to education, in conflict-affected areas, “girl’s access to education is jeopardized due to among others, insecurity, the occupation of schools by state and non-state actors as well as targeted attacks and threats against girls and their teachers by non-State actors.”
A 2012 report on the human rights situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs documented the destruction of a school by the Bangladesh army, the burning of schools by armed settlers, and the expropriation by the army of a school built by the international organization World Vision.[35]
Bangladesh has two laws that should regulate schools and universities from being interfered with by security forces. Under the “Manoeuvres, Field Firing and Artillery Practice Act” military forces are not authorized to “pass over, or encamp, construct military works of a temporary character, or execute military Manoeuvres” that enter or interfere with any educational institution.[36]
Under the “Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance” educational institutions may not be requisitioned even for a public purpose or in the public interest, “save in the case of emergency requirement for the purpose of maintenance of transport or communication system.”[37]
Bangladeshi troops who partake in UN peacekeeping operations are also obliged to not use schools in their operations.[38]
Health (Article 12 and 14)
Women in Bangladesh, and particularly rural women, face health risks from arsenic poisoning in the drinking water supply.[39]
Arsenic Poisoning
Arsenic occurs naturally in Bangladesh’s groundwater, and contaminates the drinking water of many millions of Bangladesh’s rural poor. Arsenic does not contaminate the drinking water of Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka or other large cities, where drinking water comes from deep aquifers of higher-quality water, or from treated surface water, which is then distributed through a network of pipes. Rather, it affects hand-pumped, mostly shallow, tubewells across huge swaths of rural Bangladesh. The common figure given for the number of shallow tubewells across the country is about 10 million, although this is a crude estimate.[40] Women are overwhelmingly responsible for the task of fetching water and other domestic work, Human Rights Watch found.[41] This exposes them to harmful health effects or forces them to travel great distances in order to find safe drinking water for themselves and their households.
Today, an estimated 43,000 people die each year from arsenic-related illness in Bangladesh, according to one study. The authors go on to estimate that, depending on progress of ending exposure, between 1 and 5 million of the 90 million children estimated to be born between 2000 and 2030 will eventually die of diseases caused by exposure to arsenic in drinking water.[42]
LGBT Rights
Bangladesh’s lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women face cultural, social, and political obstacles to acceptance as well as threats of violence. Lesbian women and sex workers continue to face discrimination and stigmatism. Furthermore, Bangladesh government policy and harassment by government ministry officials violates the privacy and right to work of transgender women, or hijras, in Bangladesh.
Human Rights Watch welcomes the opportunity to provide input drawn from our research on Bangladesh’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
A. Marriage Rights (Article 16 and 13a)
Bangladesh has the highest rate of child marriage in Asia, with a particularly shocking number of girls marrying before the age of 15. The prevalence of child marriage has devastating consequences for individual girls, their families, and Bangladesh’s development as a whole.
Child Marriage
Between 2005 and 2013, 29 percent of girls in Bangladesh married before the age of 15 and 65 percent married before the age of 18.[1] Despite a commitment by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in 2014 to end child marriage under age 15 by 2021 and to end child marriage under age 18 by 2041, the government has made little progress in reducing child marriage and has backtracked on these commitments in a destructive manner by seeking to create changes in the law that would effectively lower the age of marriage for girls from 18 to 16[2]
Causes and Consequences
Gender discrimination feeds social attitudes and customs that harm girls at every stage of their lives and fuel the country’s extremely high rate of child marriage. Desperate poverty remains a daily reality for many families in Bangladesh, and many parents see child marriage as their best option to safeguard the future of a daughter they feel they can neither feed nor educate nor protect. Bangladesh’s status as one of the countries in the world most affected by natural disasters and climate change adds an additional element of hardship to many families, especially those living in the most marginal and disaster-affected parts of the country.[3] In many of the villages Human Rights Watch visited in the course of researching the report Marry Before Your House is Swept Away, child marriage is not only socially acceptable but also expected.
Child marriage around the world is associated with many harmful consequences, including health dangers associated with early pregnancy, lower educational achievement for girls who marry earlier, a higher incidence of spousal violence, and an increased likelihood of poverty.[4] Research shows that pregnant girls aged 10-14 are five times more likely to die during delivery than mothers aged 20-24; girls aged 15-19 are still twice as likely to die during delivery than women aged 20-24.[5] A study across 7 countries found that girls who married before the age of 15 were more likely to experience spousal abuse than women who married after the age of 25.[6] Global data shows that girls from the poorest 20 percent of families are twice as likely to marry before 18 as girls whose families are among the richest 20 percent.[7]
Inadequate Government Response
At the July 2014 Girls Summit in London, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina committed to end marriage for girls under 15 and reduce by more than one-third the number of girls between the ages of 15 and 18 who marry by 2021. She further pledged to end all child marriages before the age of 18. The legal age of marriage in Bangladesh is currently 18 for women and 21 for men, but the law is weak, outdated, rarely enforced, and widely ignored.[8] As part of this effort, the prime minister pledged that her government would: 1) reform Bangladesh’s law which prohibits child marriage, the Child Marriage Restraint Act (CMRA) before 2015; 2) develop a national plan of action on ending child marriage by the end of 2014; and 3) take other steps to change social norms and engage civil society in the fight against child marriage.[9] But within weeks of pledging to end child marriage, Sheikh Hasina’s government proposed new legislation to lower the age of child marriage to 16.[10] Subsequent drafts of the proposed changes to the law have retained 18 as the age of marriage for girls, but proposed sweeping exceptions to that minimum, for example permitting marriage from 16 on with parental consent, that would constitute a de facto lowering of the age of marriage. Amid fierce opposition from activists and international partners to the proposed change in the age of marriage, the government’s effort to develop a national plan of action on ending child marriage has stalled, as has the process of reforming the law.
Addressing these issues can be complicated, but as long as the government looks the other way, or even facilitates child marriage, for example, when local government officials provide forged birth certificates,[11] marrying off young daughters will be a survival strategy for parents who feel unable to care for their children or succumb to social pressures to marry their daughters off early.
Discriminatory Personal Laws
About 330,000 women in Bangladesh are divorced, according to government data, and an unknown number live separated from husbands.[12] Rather than offer equal protection, Bangladesh’s discriminatory personal laws often trap women in abusive marriages or propel many of them into poverty when marriages fall apart. As we documented in our report, Will I Get My Dues…Before I Die? especially for poor women, discriminatory personal laws contribute to homelessness, hunger, and ill health for those divorced or separated and their dependents.[13] ......
Lack of Marital Property Rights
Despite the significant contributions that Bangladeshi women make to their marital households and assets, Bangladesh has no legal regime governing marital property. The 2010 law against domestic violence fills this legal gap to some extent. It gives a victim of domestic violence the right to reside in a “shared residence.”[20] The law also treats acts that cause “economic loss” as domestic violence. These include cases where a man refuses to let his wife enjoy or use properties and facilities that she is entitled to use because of her family relationship, denies her daily necessities, or deprives her of gifts she received during marriage.[21] However, apart from these protections in the law against domestic violence, neither civil laws nor personal laws in Bangladesh recognize, define, or set out rules for control over marital property during marriage or the division of marital property on an equal basis between spouses upon divorce.
Married women make contributions in many forms to family homes, businesses, fields, and other assets, providing vastly more unpaid household and caregiving labor than men. All married women whom Human Rights Watch interviewed for the report Will I Get My Dues…Before I Die? bore almost sole responsibility for household work, including cooking, cleaning, washing, grazing livestock, and fetching water. Many said they contributed significantly financially to their households at the time of, or during, marriage to their husbands to aid in their education and careers. Almost all women said they gave their husband or in-laws a dowry. Yet despite these myriad contributions, all but a handful of the women told Human Rights Watch they were unable to exercise control over their income and marital property. Nor were they able to recoup anything or have their economic value recognized when their marriages ended.
Most divorced or separated women described severe economic hardship, including losing marital homes, living on the street, begging for food, working as live-in domestics to have a roof over their heads, pulling children from school to work, struggling with ill health, and lacking resources to deal with any of these problems.[22]
Courtroom Battles and Social Assistance
Bangladesh established specialized family courts that deal with separation, divorce, and maintenance cases. But courts are so plagued with obstacles to timely maintenance, such as delays, dysfunction, and burdensome procedures, that women wait months or years for any result. Some women even face harassing counter-suits by husbands. Human Rights Watch’s research found that there are significant barriers to, and shortcomings in, Bangladesh’s social assistance programs, which fail to reach many women in extreme economic hardship after separation or divorce, and they fail to address women’s multiple vulnerabilities such as disability, ill-health, old age, and marital breakdown.
Labor Rights (Article 11)
In the past five years, two major disasters have taken numerous lives, many of them of women working in garment factories, at Rana Plaza and Tazreen. Garments account for almost 80 percent of the country’s export earnings and contribute more than 10 percent of GDP.[23] Industry growth drives Bangladesh’s economic boom, but it should not come at the price of the safety and health of workers.
Garment Work
80 percent of garment workers in Bangladesh are women.[24] A recent Human Rights Watch Report, Whoever Raises Their Head Suffers the Most found factories expose women to abuse, unsafe conditions, discrimination when it comes to wages and maternity leave, and anti-union tactics by employers, including assaults on union organizers. [25] More than 1,100 workers died in the catastrophic Rana Plaza collapse on April 24, 2013 and efforts are underway to make Bangladesh factories safer, but the government and Western retailers can and should do more to enforce international labor standards to protect workers’ rights, including their right to form unions and advocate for better conditions.[26]
Abuse
Workers report violations including physical assault, verbal abuse, forced overtime, denial of paid maternity leave, and failure to pay wages and bonuses on time or in full. The vast majority of garment workers are women, while supervisors and managers are mostly men, and sometimes the verbal abuse of women workers is of a sexual nature.[27] In 2009, the Bangladesh High Court issued strong guidelines to prevent and respond to sexual harassment at the workplace, which have yet to be systematically implemented.
Barriers to Forming Unions
While Bangladesh has changed some labor laws, including provisions to ease and facilitate the union registration process, there are significant legal barriers to forming unions, which have yet to be amended.[28] In practice, even though there has been a growth in the number of unions registered since 2013, labor authorities have arbitrarily rejected registration applications of newly formed unions.[29] Union leaders told Human Rights Watch that they continue to be targeted by threats, intimidation, and sometimes physical assault at the hands of factory management or hired third parties. In some factories, workers leading efforts to form unions have been dismissed for their organizing activities.
The Bangladesh government’s mechanism for investigating unfair labor practices is opaque and lacks process—workers who complain are not even assured the right to be heard during the investigations and the outcomes of complaints and action taken remains unknown.
Education (Article 10)
Girls in Bangladesh have made tremendous strides in education. For example, the UN notes that in 2013 Bangladesh had achieved gender parity in primary school enrolment.[30]However, obstacles remain to achieving total participation of girls in school throughout their education. Some of these obstacles include child marriage, indirect costs that burden poor families, distance to school, lack of water and sanitation facilities and sanitary supplies in schools, and sexual harassment of girls on the way to school and at school.
Exclusion of Girls
Lack of access to education is both a cause and a consequence of child marriage in Bangladesh. The link between access to education and child marriage is borne out by research finding that in Bangladesh women with primary, secondary, and higher education were respectively 24 percent, 72 percent, and 94 percent less likely to marry at a young age compared to women with no formal education.[31] Children that are out of school also often end up in the worst forms of labor.
While Bangladesh has made progress in abolishing school fees, students face associated costs for notebooks, pens, paper, textbooks, uniforms, transportation, and tutoring which put education out of reach for many poor families. Many married girls and their families interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had to leave school, often because of costs associated with education, and once they were out of school they were expected to marry or work. For others, a child marriage was the cause of them dropping out; when girls leave school to marry, schools do not intervene.
Other factors pushing girls out of school, especially as they reach secondary school age, include long distances to school in some areas, and unchecked sexual harassment of girls by men and boys on their way to school.
A lack of private toilets and sanitary supplies are also a factor in some girls’ absence from school. This makes it more difficult for girls to manage as they reach the onset of menstruation, when they become particularly likely to miss school. A study found that 40 percent of girls reported missing school during menstruation for an average of three school days each menstrual cycle.[32] In this study, 82 percent of girls said their school facilities were not appropriate for managing menstrual hygiene, only 12 percent had access to female-only toilets with water and soap available, and only 3 percent said the toilet they used had a trash bin.[33] Gaps in attendance caused by a lack of sanitation and care for menstrual hygiene also compromise girls’ eligibility for government stipends linked to attendance, cause girls to fall behind in their studies, and undermine parental support for keeping girls in school.[34]
Protecting Students, Teachers, and Schools
As detailed by the Committee in its concept note for its 2014 discussion on girls’ and women’s right to education, in conflict-affected areas, “girl’s access to education is jeopardized due to among others, insecurity, the occupation of schools by state and non-state actors as well as targeted attacks and threats against girls and their teachers by non-State actors.”
A 2012 report on the human rights situation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs documented the destruction of a school by the Bangladesh army, the burning of schools by armed settlers, and the expropriation by the army of a school built by the international organization World Vision.[35]
Bangladesh has two laws that should regulate schools and universities from being interfered with by security forces. Under the “Manoeuvres, Field Firing and Artillery Practice Act” military forces are not authorized to “pass over, or encamp, construct military works of a temporary character, or execute military Manoeuvres” that enter or interfere with any educational institution.[36]
Under the “Acquisition and Requisition of Immovable Property Ordinance” educational institutions may not be requisitioned even for a public purpose or in the public interest, “save in the case of emergency requirement for the purpose of maintenance of transport or communication system.”[37]
Bangladeshi troops who partake in UN peacekeeping operations are also obliged to not use schools in their operations.[38]
Health (Article 12 and 14)
Women in Bangladesh, and particularly rural women, face health risks from arsenic poisoning in the drinking water supply.[39]
Arsenic Poisoning
Arsenic occurs naturally in Bangladesh’s groundwater, and contaminates the drinking water of many millions of Bangladesh’s rural poor. Arsenic does not contaminate the drinking water of Bangladesh’s capital Dhaka or other large cities, where drinking water comes from deep aquifers of higher-quality water, or from treated surface water, which is then distributed through a network of pipes. Rather, it affects hand-pumped, mostly shallow, tubewells across huge swaths of rural Bangladesh. The common figure given for the number of shallow tubewells across the country is about 10 million, although this is a crude estimate.[40] Women are overwhelmingly responsible for the task of fetching water and other domestic work, Human Rights Watch found.[41] This exposes them to harmful health effects or forces them to travel great distances in order to find safe drinking water for themselves and their households.
Today, an estimated 43,000 people die each year from arsenic-related illness in Bangladesh, according to one study. The authors go on to estimate that, depending on progress of ending exposure, between 1 and 5 million of the 90 million children estimated to be born between 2000 and 2030 will eventually die of diseases caused by exposure to arsenic in drinking water.[42]
LGBT Rights
Bangladesh’s lesbian, bisexual, and transgender women face cultural, social, and political obstacles to acceptance as well as threats of violence. Lesbian women and sex workers continue to face discrimination and stigmatism. Furthermore, Bangladesh government policy and harassment by government ministry officials violates the privacy and right to work of transgender women, or hijras, in Bangladesh.
Tuesday, September 20, 2016
Latest Rampal scandal: tapping green bond cash
Commentary by Greig Aitken, BankTrack, 15th September 2016
At the Climate 2020 website, my colleague Ryan Brightwell has been assessing the ‘green-ness’ of green bonds, an increasingly popular financial instrument intended to be all about generating investment in environmentally sustainable projects.
Given their rise to prominence, Ryan describes these bonds as ‘the new black in the world of environmental finance’, and mentions how the proceeds of one green bond issued by the Export-Import Bank of India are being deployed to develop a railway link vital to the operations of the proposed Rampal coal plant project in Bangladesh. This post digs deeper into Exim Bank’s green bond deal – one with very black implications for the world-renowned Sundarbans mangrove forest and its inhabitants.
As India embarks on establishing itself as a regional – and wider – powerhouse, energy is playing a key role. The approach being taken in Delhi, however, doesn’t appear to involve much quibbling about promoting and expanding the country’s renewable energy sector while at the same time digging deeper to eke out further financial dividends from its dirty, outdated coal sector.
A key driver of these ambitions is the state-owned Export-Import Bank of India, the central finance institution promoting cross border trade and investment. Exim Bank receives regular capital infusions from the Indian government, and it also issues bonds on the international market. In fact, its bond issuances are now taking on something of an environmental flavour – jumping into the rapidly developing international ‘green bond’ market, Exim Bank raised USD 500 million in 2015 with its first green bond offering.
The bank intends to issue further green bonds later this year, so it’s worth looking more closely at this green financing, particularly given its relevance to Exim Bank’s involvement in one of the most controversial energy projects shaping up currently in the subcontinent – the Rampal coal power plant in Bangladesh.
Exim Bank has been extending considerable loan sums to many recipients in recent years, including its smaller eastern neighbour Bangladesh. A loan of USD 1 billion for infrastructure development was provided in 2010, with a follow-up for the same amount in 2014 – and, in 2016, this lending largesse doubled to USD 2 billion for the financing of various social and infrastructure development projects. One such project falling under this latter umbrella loan is a 64.75 kilometre railway line connecting the Mongla Port in the Sundarbans mangrove forest to the town of Khulna.
Before we get into the specifics of this seemingly innocuous rail link project, some context.
Exim Bank is this year considering a great big USD 1.6 billion addition to its portfolio in the shape of a buyer’s credit for the Bangladeshi-Indian joint venture leading the construction of the proposed 1320 megawatt Rampal coal-fired power plant. The plant’s location is currently a mere four kilometres from the ecologically critical area surrounding the Sundarbans, the world’s largest mangrove forest.
A UNESCO World Heritage site and protected under the Ramsar Convention as a ‘wetland of international importance’, the Sundarbans is home to Bengal tigers and is a source of livelihood for millions. It also acts as a vital natural defence for low-lying Bangladesh from storms and the tidal surge generated from the cyclonic depression in the Bay of Bengal.
In short, the Sundarbans is an incredible natural wonder and resource that does not need a large coal plant on its doorstep, and thus the plan to build the Rampal plant has stirred major opposition nationally as well as internationally. In the face of this, the project promoters are now unleashing a torrent of dubious PR spin – incredibly, the baseline assertion now is that “Rampal Power Plant will not damage rather it will preserve the Sundarbans.”
So what of the Mongla Port-Khulna rail link? For one thing, while the source of coal to feed the plant has not yet been agreed (increasing speculation has it that it could well be coming from India), there is no getting around the fact that coal supplies for Rampal will have to be shipped through the sensitive rivers of the Sundarbans, arriving at the port of Mongla.
Following tough negotiations last year with Bangladesh’s rail authorities, a 21.11 kilometre rail link is being added to the Mongla-Khulna line in order to supply coal to the Rampal plant site directly. And this is the kicker: the Mongla-Khulna railway construction appears under the auditor’s certification of Exim Bank’s first green bond issuance. Making use of a green bond’s proceeds – USD 580,000 has been earmarked specifically for the railway project – to finance strategic coal infrastructure in this way is completely inappropriate.
This is not the type of project that springs to mind when one thinks of ‘green bonds’. According to the Green Bond Principles, green bonds are designed to “finance new and existing projects with environmental benefits”, yet this railway line is a strategic part of the infrastructure for a coal plant that has the potential to inflict deeply damaging impacts on a globally prized ecosystem.
In spite of these principles, disagreements abound within the global financial sector and beyond about their stringency. There is scope unfortunately for environmentally egregious investments to be funded by green bonds – see, for example, the case of a GDF Suez green bond raising funds for a controversial large dam project in the Amazon, and the latest Chinese green bonds that could finance ‘clean coal’. Exim Bank’s green bond financing of the Rampal rail link threatens to be a similarly questionable ‘green’ investment.
Should Exim Bank go ahead this year and provide the entire USD 1.6 billion loan for Rampal, the bank’s head for one has already recognised that this is bound to result in reputational risks. Yet even as its credit ratings have been coming under pressure, the bank has seen fit to deploy part of its first green bond proceeds to finance vital infrastructure for a highly contentious coal plant.
While many other finance institutions are showing progress when it comes to responsible investing, this green bond sleight of hand sets a regrettable precedent for any upcoming ‘green financing’ from Exim Bank. The bank’s approach with the rail link – seemingly compelled by Rampal project tactics – will further impact its credibility and may bring consequences for its future fundraising capacity.
This misuse of a green bond is a further reason to demand that Exim Bank of India abandons its financing plans for the Rampal coal plant. You can add your voice to a growing international call aimed at the bank, either as an organisation or as an individual.
At the Climate 2020 website, my colleague Ryan Brightwell has been assessing the ‘green-ness’ of green bonds, an increasingly popular financial instrument intended to be all about generating investment in environmentally sustainable projects.
Given their rise to prominence, Ryan describes these bonds as ‘the new black in the world of environmental finance’, and mentions how the proceeds of one green bond issued by the Export-Import Bank of India are being deployed to develop a railway link vital to the operations of the proposed Rampal coal plant project in Bangladesh. This post digs deeper into Exim Bank’s green bond deal – one with very black implications for the world-renowned Sundarbans mangrove forest and its inhabitants.
As India embarks on establishing itself as a regional – and wider – powerhouse, energy is playing a key role. The approach being taken in Delhi, however, doesn’t appear to involve much quibbling about promoting and expanding the country’s renewable energy sector while at the same time digging deeper to eke out further financial dividends from its dirty, outdated coal sector.
A key driver of these ambitions is the state-owned Export-Import Bank of India, the central finance institution promoting cross border trade and investment. Exim Bank receives regular capital infusions from the Indian government, and it also issues bonds on the international market. In fact, its bond issuances are now taking on something of an environmental flavour – jumping into the rapidly developing international ‘green bond’ market, Exim Bank raised USD 500 million in 2015 with its first green bond offering.
The bank intends to issue further green bonds later this year, so it’s worth looking more closely at this green financing, particularly given its relevance to Exim Bank’s involvement in one of the most controversial energy projects shaping up currently in the subcontinent – the Rampal coal power plant in Bangladesh.
Exim Bank has been extending considerable loan sums to many recipients in recent years, including its smaller eastern neighbour Bangladesh. A loan of USD 1 billion for infrastructure development was provided in 2010, with a follow-up for the same amount in 2014 – and, in 2016, this lending largesse doubled to USD 2 billion for the financing of various social and infrastructure development projects. One such project falling under this latter umbrella loan is a 64.75 kilometre railway line connecting the Mongla Port in the Sundarbans mangrove forest to the town of Khulna.
Before we get into the specifics of this seemingly innocuous rail link project, some context.
Exim Bank is this year considering a great big USD 1.6 billion addition to its portfolio in the shape of a buyer’s credit for the Bangladeshi-Indian joint venture leading the construction of the proposed 1320 megawatt Rampal coal-fired power plant. The plant’s location is currently a mere four kilometres from the ecologically critical area surrounding the Sundarbans, the world’s largest mangrove forest.
A UNESCO World Heritage site and protected under the Ramsar Convention as a ‘wetland of international importance’, the Sundarbans is home to Bengal tigers and is a source of livelihood for millions. It also acts as a vital natural defence for low-lying Bangladesh from storms and the tidal surge generated from the cyclonic depression in the Bay of Bengal.
In short, the Sundarbans is an incredible natural wonder and resource that does not need a large coal plant on its doorstep, and thus the plan to build the Rampal plant has stirred major opposition nationally as well as internationally. In the face of this, the project promoters are now unleashing a torrent of dubious PR spin – incredibly, the baseline assertion now is that “Rampal Power Plant will not damage rather it will preserve the Sundarbans.”
So what of the Mongla Port-Khulna rail link? For one thing, while the source of coal to feed the plant has not yet been agreed (increasing speculation has it that it could well be coming from India), there is no getting around the fact that coal supplies for Rampal will have to be shipped through the sensitive rivers of the Sundarbans, arriving at the port of Mongla.
Following tough negotiations last year with Bangladesh’s rail authorities, a 21.11 kilometre rail link is being added to the Mongla-Khulna line in order to supply coal to the Rampal plant site directly. And this is the kicker: the Mongla-Khulna railway construction appears under the auditor’s certification of Exim Bank’s first green bond issuance. Making use of a green bond’s proceeds – USD 580,000 has been earmarked specifically for the railway project – to finance strategic coal infrastructure in this way is completely inappropriate.
This is not the type of project that springs to mind when one thinks of ‘green bonds’. According to the Green Bond Principles, green bonds are designed to “finance new and existing projects with environmental benefits”, yet this railway line is a strategic part of the infrastructure for a coal plant that has the potential to inflict deeply damaging impacts on a globally prized ecosystem.
In spite of these principles, disagreements abound within the global financial sector and beyond about their stringency. There is scope unfortunately for environmentally egregious investments to be funded by green bonds – see, for example, the case of a GDF Suez green bond raising funds for a controversial large dam project in the Amazon, and the latest Chinese green bonds that could finance ‘clean coal’. Exim Bank’s green bond financing of the Rampal rail link threatens to be a similarly questionable ‘green’ investment.
Should Exim Bank go ahead this year and provide the entire USD 1.6 billion loan for Rampal, the bank’s head for one has already recognised that this is bound to result in reputational risks. Yet even as its credit ratings have been coming under pressure, the bank has seen fit to deploy part of its first green bond proceeds to finance vital infrastructure for a highly contentious coal plant.
While many other finance institutions are showing progress when it comes to responsible investing, this green bond sleight of hand sets a regrettable precedent for any upcoming ‘green financing’ from Exim Bank. The bank’s approach with the rail link – seemingly compelled by Rampal project tactics – will further impact its credibility and may bring consequences for its future fundraising capacity.
This misuse of a green bond is a further reason to demand that Exim Bank of India abandons its financing plans for the Rampal coal plant. You can add your voice to a growing international call aimed at the bank, either as an organisation or as an individual.
U.S. Tax Dollars Threaten Largest Mangrove Forest
By Friends of the Earth / EcoWatch
In conjunction with the Save the Sundarbans protest today at the UN's headquarters in New York City, we're revealing in this EcoWatch exclusive that Friends of the Earth U.S. obtained documents that suggest the U.S. Export-Import Bank, Ex-Im Bank, which is supported by taxpayer dollars, is considering financing the Orion-Khulna coal plant near the Sundarbans in Bangladesh.
The struggle for climate justice in Bangladesh, however, did win an important battle in July. Responding to public pressure from advocacy groups, Ex-Im Bank is no longer considering financing for a coal plant proposed to be built outside Bangladesh's capital city of Dhaka, one of the largest cities in the world. This coal plant, known as the Orion-Dhaka project, would burn coal just a few miles outside Dhaka, poisoning the air and water of 17 million people. While it remains unclear if the Orion-Dhaka project will move forward without U.S. financing, Ex-Im Bank's withdrawal represents an important victory for protecting people and the climate.
Battle Won, But Fight Continues
While activists celebrate this decision, our celebration is short-lived. We have reason to believe that Ex-Im Bank will finance another coal plant in Bangladesh. According to media reports, the Bangladeshi company Orion Group, originally claimed to have secured financing for not one, but two coal projects in Bangladesh from Ex-Im Bank.
The second coal plant, known as the Orion-Khulna project, is proposed to be built 14 kilometers from the Sundarbans, the world's largest mangrove forest and a UNESCO World Heritage site. The Sundarbans, which spans the border of India and Bangladesh, is home to endangered species like the Bengal tiger and Irrawaddy dolphin, and provides a home and livelihoods for upwards of 6 million people.
The coal plant would greatly damage the Sundarbans' surrounding ecosystem, threaten the human rights of thousands and contribute to runaway climate change. Indeed, as a nation, Bangladesh is one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in the world; its people cannot afford for any more coal to be burned.
An Op-Ed that Ex-Im Bank Chairman Fred Hochberg wrote about his trip to Bangladesh in February of 2016 demonstrates Ex-Im Bank's interest in financing projects there. Indeed, under Hochberg's tenure, Ex-Im has supported more than $650 million in U.S. exports to Bangladesh. The status of the Orion-Khulna coal plant is currently unknown, since Ex-Im Bank has provided so little information about its involvement in the project. However, recent news indicates the Orion-Khulna project could move forward soon. Another massive coal project proposed to be built near the Sundarbans, the Rampal coal plant, just secured financing from India's Export-Import Bank. According to local Bangladeshi groups, if the Rampal project proceeds, Orion-Khulna will follow soon after.
Another reason for Americans to be concerned about this international issue is one of the largest U.S. corporations, and a serial environmental polluter and tax evader, General Electric (GE), is slated to receive U.S. Ex-Im financing for its involvement in the construction of the Orion-Khulna coal plant. GE is no stranger to controversy. GE's poor environmental track record includes polluting the Hudson River with toxic waste water from 1947 to 1977 and supplying the nuclear reactors that faltered and led to the Fukushima nuclear plant explosion in 2011. GE, one of the long-running top beneficiaries of Ex-Im—the second largest recipient of Ex-Im financing after Boeing, is contracted to supply the turbine generators for the Orion-Khulna coal plant. Since acquiring the French power company Alstom, GE has expressed a renewed interest in coal throughout the world, including in Southeast Asia.
Troubling FOIA Revelations
Now, present day, here is why the new Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents matter: the heavily redacted FOIA documents we obtained reveal further evidence to support the claim that U.S. Ex-Im Bank is considering financing for the Orion-Khulna project and that GE is involved.
They show that Ex-Im Bank was in talks as late as February 2016 with Bangladeshi government officials and GE about coal projects, which most likely include the Orion-Khulna coal plant. The FOIA documents show that during Ex-Im Bank Chairman Hochberg's February visit to Bangladesh, he met with high-ranking officials from Bangladesh's power ministry and energy sector, including the energy advisor and directors from GE. GE's alleged involvement in the Orion-Khulna project and expressed interest in building more coal projects in Southeast Asia suggest that Hochberg very likely discussed financing the Orion coal projects in these meetings.
In addition, a note that merely said "Adani coal project," was scribbled on a document from the meeting between Fred Hochberg and GE officials. Adani Group is an Indian conglomerate made up of various subsidiary companies, including Adani Mining, which operates in Australia, Indonesia and other coal-rich countries. This leads to troubling speculation that Australian coal from the controversial Adani-owned Carmichael coal mine and the Abbott Point coal export terminal, which poses grave threats to the Great Barrier Reef, could supply the coal for Orion's coal projects in Bangladesh.
India has indeed recently said they plan on increasing their coal exports to Bangladesh. This statement further supports the theory that the coal used for the Orion coal plants will come from Adani's problematic Australia coal projects. As it happens, Ex-Im Bank is also considering financing Adani's Carmichael coal mine project. Although pure speculation, if Adani's coal projects in Australia ended up supplying coal for the Orion projects in Bangladesh, the U.S government would be entangled in climate disaster and social and environmental destruction across multiple levels.
Undermining Obama's Climate Legacy
Given the recent actions the U.S. has taken to address climate change, it's very troubling that the U.S. government is still considering financing coal projects at all. Supporting new coal development greatly undermines President Obama's much-touted climate legacy, including his commitment under the Climate Action Plan to restrict financing coal plants overseas and the recent formal U.S. commitment to the Paris agreement, which aspires to limit global temperature rise to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius and thus rules out any question of U.S. investment in coal. This also raises questions about what other fossil fuel projects Ex-Im is considering financing.
Grassroots Pressure, Applied Globally
Despite the schemes of Big Business and bad political actors, people around the world are successfully challenging the coal equation. Ex-Im Bank's response regarding the Orion-Dhaka project came as a result of pressure from activists and civil society groups in Bangladesh and the U.S., who sent more than 156,000 petition signatures to Ex-Im Bank in late June. The petition asked Ex-Im Bank to publicly reject financing for Orion's coal projects. A strong grassroots movement in Bangladesh is fighting to protect the Sundarbans from coal development. There have been two marches over the past several years attended by hundreds of thousands of people in Bangladesh.
Most recently, a student was arrested for posting a comment on Facebook criticizing the Bangladeshi government's support for the Rampal coal plant. The people have spoken: New coal development is toxic to our environment and human health, and we refuse to accept the status quo anymore.
The fight to protect the Sundarbans is not only gaining momentum in Bangladesh, it has become an international issue. This past year Save the Sundarbans protests have been held in Paris,Washington DC, Atlanta and New York.
This growing movement came full circle today [Sep. 19], when environmental groups and local Bangladeshi and Indian-American activists held a Save the Sundarbans protest in New York City while President Obama and Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina attended a UN General Assembly meeting. Protesters called for the Sundarbans to be protected and for an end to harmful coal projects in Bangladesh.
To honor the U.S.'s commitment to fight climate change and preserve a livable planet for future generations and for the sake of the people and wildlife who call the Sundarbans home in Bangladesh, U.S. Ex-Im Bank must publicly reject financing for the Orion-Khulna coal plant, once and for all.
In conjunction with the Save the Sundarbans protest today at the UN's headquarters in New York City, we're revealing in this EcoWatch exclusive that Friends of the Earth U.S. obtained documents that suggest the U.S. Export-Import Bank, Ex-Im Bank, which is supported by taxpayer dollars, is considering financing the Orion-Khulna coal plant near the Sundarbans in Bangladesh.
The struggle for climate justice in Bangladesh, however, did win an important battle in July. Responding to public pressure from advocacy groups, Ex-Im Bank is no longer considering financing for a coal plant proposed to be built outside Bangladesh's capital city of Dhaka, one of the largest cities in the world. This coal plant, known as the Orion-Dhaka project, would burn coal just a few miles outside Dhaka, poisoning the air and water of 17 million people. While it remains unclear if the Orion-Dhaka project will move forward without U.S. financing, Ex-Im Bank's withdrawal represents an important victory for protecting people and the climate.
Battle Won, But Fight Continues
While activists celebrate this decision, our celebration is short-lived. We have reason to believe that Ex-Im Bank will finance another coal plant in Bangladesh. According to media reports, the Bangladeshi company Orion Group, originally claimed to have secured financing for not one, but two coal projects in Bangladesh from Ex-Im Bank.
The second coal plant, known as the Orion-Khulna project, is proposed to be built 14 kilometers from the Sundarbans, the world's largest mangrove forest and a UNESCO World Heritage site. The Sundarbans, which spans the border of India and Bangladesh, is home to endangered species like the Bengal tiger and Irrawaddy dolphin, and provides a home and livelihoods for upwards of 6 million people.
The coal plant would greatly damage the Sundarbans' surrounding ecosystem, threaten the human rights of thousands and contribute to runaway climate change. Indeed, as a nation, Bangladesh is one of the countries most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change in the world; its people cannot afford for any more coal to be burned.
An Op-Ed that Ex-Im Bank Chairman Fred Hochberg wrote about his trip to Bangladesh in February of 2016 demonstrates Ex-Im Bank's interest in financing projects there. Indeed, under Hochberg's tenure, Ex-Im has supported more than $650 million in U.S. exports to Bangladesh. The status of the Orion-Khulna coal plant is currently unknown, since Ex-Im Bank has provided so little information about its involvement in the project. However, recent news indicates the Orion-Khulna project could move forward soon. Another massive coal project proposed to be built near the Sundarbans, the Rampal coal plant, just secured financing from India's Export-Import Bank. According to local Bangladeshi groups, if the Rampal project proceeds, Orion-Khulna will follow soon after.
Another reason for Americans to be concerned about this international issue is one of the largest U.S. corporations, and a serial environmental polluter and tax evader, General Electric (GE), is slated to receive U.S. Ex-Im financing for its involvement in the construction of the Orion-Khulna coal plant. GE is no stranger to controversy. GE's poor environmental track record includes polluting the Hudson River with toxic waste water from 1947 to 1977 and supplying the nuclear reactors that faltered and led to the Fukushima nuclear plant explosion in 2011. GE, one of the long-running top beneficiaries of Ex-Im—the second largest recipient of Ex-Im financing after Boeing, is contracted to supply the turbine generators for the Orion-Khulna coal plant. Since acquiring the French power company Alstom, GE has expressed a renewed interest in coal throughout the world, including in Southeast Asia.
Troubling FOIA Revelations
Now, present day, here is why the new Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) documents matter: the heavily redacted FOIA documents we obtained reveal further evidence to support the claim that U.S. Ex-Im Bank is considering financing for the Orion-Khulna project and that GE is involved.
They show that Ex-Im Bank was in talks as late as February 2016 with Bangladeshi government officials and GE about coal projects, which most likely include the Orion-Khulna coal plant. The FOIA documents show that during Ex-Im Bank Chairman Hochberg's February visit to Bangladesh, he met with high-ranking officials from Bangladesh's power ministry and energy sector, including the energy advisor and directors from GE. GE's alleged involvement in the Orion-Khulna project and expressed interest in building more coal projects in Southeast Asia suggest that Hochberg very likely discussed financing the Orion coal projects in these meetings.
In addition, a note that merely said "Adani coal project," was scribbled on a document from the meeting between Fred Hochberg and GE officials. Adani Group is an Indian conglomerate made up of various subsidiary companies, including Adani Mining, which operates in Australia, Indonesia and other coal-rich countries. This leads to troubling speculation that Australian coal from the controversial Adani-owned Carmichael coal mine and the Abbott Point coal export terminal, which poses grave threats to the Great Barrier Reef, could supply the coal for Orion's coal projects in Bangladesh.
India has indeed recently said they plan on increasing their coal exports to Bangladesh. This statement further supports the theory that the coal used for the Orion coal plants will come from Adani's problematic Australia coal projects. As it happens, Ex-Im Bank is also considering financing Adani's Carmichael coal mine project. Although pure speculation, if Adani's coal projects in Australia ended up supplying coal for the Orion projects in Bangladesh, the U.S government would be entangled in climate disaster and social and environmental destruction across multiple levels.
Undermining Obama's Climate Legacy
Given the recent actions the U.S. has taken to address climate change, it's very troubling that the U.S. government is still considering financing coal projects at all. Supporting new coal development greatly undermines President Obama's much-touted climate legacy, including his commitment under the Climate Action Plan to restrict financing coal plants overseas and the recent formal U.S. commitment to the Paris agreement, which aspires to limit global temperature rise to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius and thus rules out any question of U.S. investment in coal. This also raises questions about what other fossil fuel projects Ex-Im is considering financing.
Grassroots Pressure, Applied Globally
Despite the schemes of Big Business and bad political actors, people around the world are successfully challenging the coal equation. Ex-Im Bank's response regarding the Orion-Dhaka project came as a result of pressure from activists and civil society groups in Bangladesh and the U.S., who sent more than 156,000 petition signatures to Ex-Im Bank in late June. The petition asked Ex-Im Bank to publicly reject financing for Orion's coal projects. A strong grassroots movement in Bangladesh is fighting to protect the Sundarbans from coal development. There have been two marches over the past several years attended by hundreds of thousands of people in Bangladesh.
Most recently, a student was arrested for posting a comment on Facebook criticizing the Bangladeshi government's support for the Rampal coal plant. The people have spoken: New coal development is toxic to our environment and human health, and we refuse to accept the status quo anymore.
The fight to protect the Sundarbans is not only gaining momentum in Bangladesh, it has become an international issue. This past year Save the Sundarbans protests have been held in Paris,Washington DC, Atlanta and New York.
This growing movement came full circle today [Sep. 19], when environmental groups and local Bangladeshi and Indian-American activists held a Save the Sundarbans protest in New York City while President Obama and Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina attended a UN General Assembly meeting. Protesters called for the Sundarbans to be protected and for an end to harmful coal projects in Bangladesh.
To honor the U.S.'s commitment to fight climate change and preserve a livable planet for future generations and for the sake of the people and wildlife who call the Sundarbans home in Bangladesh, U.S. Ex-Im Bank must publicly reject financing for the Orion-Khulna coal plant, once and for all.
Monday, September 12, 2016
Shipping lane in the Sundarbans
Shipping and navigation through the Sundarbans is booming
like never before. Unauthorised navigation routes are expanding. The vessels
range from ocean-going mother and feeder cargo ships, container carriers, tankers, lighterage
ships, mid-size bulk cargo and tankers from inland waterways, and
trans-boundary cargo ships between Bangladesh and India. Without any sort of
environmental management in place, this increasing navigation and shipping are
multiplying the risk of accidents/spills and regular pollution in the world’s
largest mangrove forest.
It was a quiet and cool at daybreak in the world’s largest
mangrove forest – the Sundarbans – on December 28, 2008; amidst the morning
mist, I was heading towards the wildlife sanctuary. I was tired and fell asleep
on the deck as soon as the mechanised boat sailed, only to find myself rudely
awakened, with a giant cargo ship before my eyes, its siren-sound in my ears.
From the master bridge, the cargo crew was shouting toward
our tiny boat over loudspeakers. In response, our boatman was desperately
explaining ‘something’ with a diverse range of sign languages, it seemed. The
fact that we weren’t flying the Bangladeshi flag meant the cargo ship suspected
us of being pirates.
In the middle of all this, I somehow managed to locate where
we were. That’s when the question hit me: why is there a cargo vessel on the
Arpangasia river, deep inside the forest?
Accident or no accident,
Sundarbans suffers daily
Now, eight years after that face-off, in these times of
controversy and protests against a coal-fired mega-power plant in the impact
zone of the Sundarbans, the forest faces a very high volume of shipping and
navigation every day. Data from the Bangladesh Inland Water Transport Authority
shows a 102% increase in cargo carrying between India and Bangladesh through
Sundarban waterways over the past 8 years. In 2008-09, a total of 9,44,422
metric tons of cargo was transported between India and Bangladesh under the
arrangement of the Protocol on Inland Water Transit and Trade (PIWT&T); and
in the last fiscal it was 19,12,526 metric tons.
The PIWT&T was first signed in 1972 and since then it
has been continuing without any interruption. The latest renewal was signed on
June 6, 2015. There are eight navigation routes permitted under this protocol,
four among those are laid near the Sundarbans.
Officially, the the acknowledged routes of PIWT&T are
drawn along northern edge of the forest. However, during my participation in
several learning trips throughout the last year I have found that the vessels
use four major de facto routes laid through the river and canals of the reserve
forests and wildlife sanctuaries. I have encountered vessels deep inside the
forest and even in the Sundarban West Wildlife Sanctuary – which is also a
UNESCO world heritage site – and on the
Arpangasia, Jamuna and Malancha rivers too. In the first half of 2015,
on average of 228 vessels used these routes monthly.
This is because the de jure
routes have not been navigable since the late ’90s. On the other hand,
data released by the Mongla Port Authority shows a 172% increase in the number
of ocean going vessels over the past eight years through the Passur river. In
the last fiscal, the total number of ocean-going vessels through this Sundarban
stream were 889, while it was only 326 in the year of 2008-09. Exact data of
shipping by domestic cargo ships is not available.
The Sela river, which runs through the sanctuaries for
endangered Irrawaddy and Ganges river dolphin and along the northern edge of
the Sundarban East Wildlife Sanctuary, has been under the spotlight since
December 9, 2014, when a wrecked tanker released approximately 94,000 gallons
(78,271 imperial gallons) of heavy fuel. The Sela oil spill brought devastating
consequence for the mangrove habitat and wildlife. The shocking picture of
oil-soaked birds other mega-fauna like
dolphins successfully drew local and global attention to the danger of
non-regulated navigation through a wetland of international significance as
designated under the Ramsar Convention also.
The shipping ministry suspended navigation through the
river, with huge press coverage in response, only to silently re-open it after
a few days. During four days of observation in four different months of 2015 at
the confluence of Sela and Passur rivers,
I have observed on average 17 ships are coming through. The inland
shipping authority has not made public
any shipping data in till date.
The question is, why does the Bangladesh government not
spare the Sela river and wildlife sanctuaries by diverting the Mongla-port
bound domestic vessels to the original port route – the Mongla-Ghashiakhali
channel? It is because the agencies are failing to maintain the depth and
navigability of the Ghashiakhali channel in the face of land grabbing by
‘influential’ shrimp businesses and other industries. Apparently, even a
directive from the prime minister’s office failed to remove the shrimp farms
and evict the land grabbers to permanently reopen the route.
Everyone said the devastations from Sela oil spill is an
eye-opener for the responsible authorities, but after more than one and half
years, it is clear that it was not. Just months after the accident two other
wrecked vessels released tonnes of fertiliser and coal into the rivers in May
and October, 2015 respectively.
‘Lot of ships will be coming, carrying so much
coal’
Now, with the 1320-megawatt coal-fired power station, a
joint venture by Bangladesh and India near the Sundarbans on the anvil, the
National Shipping Corporation has started the process of procuring 16 new
vessels to carry coal for the power plant. The mega plant will need an
estimated 4.72 million tons of coal per year to be imported through Sundarban
rivers. Beside combustion of coal in the forest’s impact zone, the power plant
is going to aggravate the unsustainable industrialization in the
state-acknowledged ecologically critical area near the forest, and it will
boost shipping on a larger scale.
This coal-fired mega power plant is going to be a deciding
factor for the fate of Sundarban. For Bangladesh’s government, it is not about
merely building a power plant close to or far from the mangrove forest. Prime
Minister Sheikh Hasina in her latest briefing on this issue made it very clear
that her government is determined to meet the growing demands of electricity
for the country’s envisioned industrialization. And this ‘Bangladesh-India
Friendship Thermal Power Plant’ at Rampal is one of those coal-based plants the
government has decided to install in different parts of the country to meet the
growing electricity demand, she said. The government thinks coal is more
suitable than petroleum, natural gas and other fuels in terms of availability
and price. Moreover, areas close to the sea are best suited for building
coal-fired plants because it reduces the shipping cost of imported coal, she
added.
So, even though the government endorsed Environmental Impact
Assessment report acknowledges some threats originating from the mega-project,
it decided to carry on. The EIA states that the proposed jetty to unload coal
in the Sundarbans, and shipping through the forest, will cause oil spillage,
air, noise and light pollution. An
influential member of the ruling party and cabinet, finance minister M.A.
Muhith recently said publicly that the Sundarbans are surely going to suffer
due to this power plant but the government will proceed with the project. ‘A
lot of ships will be coming, carrying so much coal. So flora and fauna will be
substantially affected,’ said Muhith, who is also the founding president of
Bangladesh’s most familiar environmental civil society platform, ‘Bangladesh Poribesh Andolon’.
Given the continuous manifold increase in international,
regional and inland shipping through threatened wildlife sanctuaries and
reserves, the odds are very high that devastating accidents will happen.
Nevertheless, there is no mandatory standard for ship safety features to
mitigate the risk of accident. The forest and environmental authorities are
seemingly comfortable with rapidly increasing shipping through the Sundarbans.
More than one decade after signing a MoU with the concerned
regional forum to develop and adopt a national contingency plan to respond to
oil spills and other chemical leakage, there is no known progress till date.
Immediately after the hela oil spill, the ministry of environment and forest
said that they revived the efforts for contingency plan under a UNDP supported
initiative. However, I do not know of any progress made though the project
expired. When contacted, the chief conservator of forests, Md. Yunus Ali, said,
‘This task was given to the department ofeEnvironment. They conducted consultations
with stakeholders in their office. I am not updated yet about finalisation of
the contingency plan.’
Increased shipping not only multiplies risks from oil spill,
the release of coal, chemical, fertilizer and fly ash by accident; in course of
routine operation, vessels discharge ballast water, bilge water, and there is
cargo tank washing too. There is also the impact of ship-induced waves on the
mangrove ecosystem, disturbance to wildlife and the risk of international
wildlife trafficking spreading widely with regular vessel based pollution.
The moving and manoeuvring of vessels induce a variety of
hydrodynamic changes and physical forces which have an impact on the
surrounding flow, alluvial banks and sediments of the rivers. These impacts
potentially harm the environment and can ultimately lead to environmental
degradation.
The growth of Mongla port also comes with increasing risk of
Invasive Aquatic Species for the delicate ecosystem of the Sundarbans.
According to resources available with international Ballast Water Management
Consortium- GloBallast; the introductions of alien species by ballast water in
the hulls of vessels have negative effects on mangrove habitats. For instance,
they hugely compete with indigenous species for space and food.
In the absence of minimum environmental management and
preparedness, Bangladesh and India are allowing a high volume of shipping,
navigation and industrialisation in and around the Sundarban mangrove region.
Even in the British colonial period, when the 21st century’s new obligation of
‘sustainability’ was nowhere to be heard, the authorities were very careful to
avoid using the rivers and canals inside the Sundarbans for shipping and
navigation. In the era of ‘golden fiber’ jute trade between the Khulna-Barisal
regions and Kolkata, the ‘River Conservancy’ was there in the bureaucratic
consideration to maintain navigability of waterways outside the Sundarbans.
‘History of the Rivers in the Gangetic Delta, 1750-1918’, a
report prepared by a former chief engineer of the colonial irrigation
department, C. Addams Williams,
describes some of the many
initiatives to maintain the navigability of the northern waterways of
Gorai-Modhumoti river systems. Those rivers still exist, with inadequate water
flow however. For safer trade routes, Bangladesh and India can work together to
improve the navigability of northern rivers by simply increasing the upstream
water flow and establishing a environmental management regime for Mongla port
bound ships through the Passur river.
Mohammad Arju is a journalist and marine conservationist.
Email arju@saveoursea.social
Thursday, September 8, 2016
Questions and answers on the Rampal Power Plant
Q: Have the Feasibility Study, Initial
Environmental Examination and Environmental Impact Assessment on the Rampal
Power Plant been made public?
A: Feasibility Study and IEE were not made public
and not posted on the website. Recently, the EIA has been published on the
website. There remain lots of controversies in the EIA Report. In the EIA
Report some parameters are mentioned quantitatively and most of the negative
environmental effects have been mentioned qualitatively.
Q: Whether consultancy for the Feasibility
Study was awarded in a transparent way or not?
A: The Feasibility Study was assigned to the
National Thermal Power Company Ltd. (NTPC), India on 30 September 2010.
The whole procedure has violated the Article 13 of Public Procurement Act
of 2006 and Article 3 of Public Procurement Rules of 2008, as the PDB appointed
NTPC on sole-source basis without any competitive bid. Moreover, appointment of
the NTPC as Consultants for Feasibility Study being a Joint Venture partner is
not at all sensible. The consultant should have been an independent
organization, so that their professional ethics could not be questioned.
Moreover, feasibility report was not discussed publicly.
Q: Whether the IEE and EIA were conducted in a
transparent way or not?
A: The Center for Geographic and Environmental
Information System (CGEIS) was engaged for the IEE and the EIA on sole source
basis. Thus, no competitive bid was invited. This is again the violation of the
Public Procurement Act of 2006 and Public Procurement Rules of 2008. However,
the IEE Report was submitted on 6 October, 2010 and site clearance was given by
the Department of Environment (DoE) on 23 May 2011. It is pertinent to note
that the Environmental Clearance Permission issued by the DoE for Rampal Coal
Power Plant is much different from the one issued for Matabari Coal Power
Plant.
Q: Are all the parameters for the Feasibility
Study (FS) authentic and objective?
A: Many parameters considered in the FS are not
valid and objective. For example, Plant Factor (PF) was taken as 100% and
efficiency was taken as 44% for Rampal Coal Power Plant in the Feasibility
Study for economic analysis. It can be noted that the PF considered for
Matabari Coal Power Plant of similar size is 80% only. In case of all types of power plants, shutdown for regular
maintenance and emergency maintenance are common. Usually it takes 10-20% of
the available time to recover. But in some cases, major over handling causes
shutdown period much longer. So, the assumption of PF as 100% is impractical.
Similarly, the assumption of efficiency is also impractical. Both the PF and
Efficiency are impossible to achieve in a given condition in Bangladesh. The
following table shows the comparative pictures of maximum PF and efficiency
among some countries where it can be seen that the maximum PF and efficiency of
the existing power plants of Bangladesh is lower.
Table 1: Max PF and Efficiency
level of Coal Power Plants
Country
|
Max PF
|
Efficiency
|
USA
|
58%
|
-
|
China
|
55%
|
-
|
India
|
50%
|
29-33%
|
Bangladesh*
|
45.11%
|
32.39%
|
* The Bangladesh figure
has been mentioned for all Public Sector Power Plants in the Annual Report of
BPDB 2014-15.
If actual PF and
efficiency are less than what has been proposed in FS, then, it will have major
effect on the Economic Analysis and specially, on Cost of Energy (COE) and
Levellized Tariff (LT) calculation. COE and LT will increase with lower PF and
Efficiency. In that case, economic viability and sustainability of the project
cannot be justified. According to FS following are the per MW cost and COE per kWh:
Table 2: Per MW cost and
COE per KWH
Description
|
Project Cost
(IRs Cr/MW)/(Tk/MW) |
Levellised COE (IP/kWh
|
||
Fixed
|
Variable
|
Total
|
||
Base Case (Loan Interest 12.5%)
|
IR 6.59/
(Tk 10.48) |
IR 184/
(Tk 2.92) |
IR 312/
(Tk 4.96) |
IR 496/
(Tk 7.88) |
FR Cost
|
IR 8.23/
(Tk 13.06)* |
IR 226/
(Tk 3.59) |
IR 312/
(Tk 4.96) |
IR 538/
(Tk 8.55) |
* Tk = Bangladeshi Taka;
USD= 0.1096/kWh (1USD= Tk 78.00); IR = Indian Rupee
Source: EIA Report
According to the experts
the CoE may increase by minimum 50% and in such case Levellised Tarff
will be Tk. 12.829 (US$=0.1644).
Q.
What is the cost of such Coal Power Plants in India?
A. In India many USC
coal Power Plants are currently under construction and some of them are run by
BHEL in collaboration with foreign partners. Cost of such projects varies from $
0.9 to 1.1 million/MW. But the per MW cost of Rampal Coal Power Plant is now $
1.22 million and it is sure to be increased.
Q: What are the sources of funding?
A: The official estimate of the total capital cost
of the project has risen over time and currently stands at US$1.82 billion.
IEEFA would suggest a further capital cost reaching to at least US$2bn
approximately. Equity capital is proposed at 30% of the total, with 50% of the
equity owned by the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB) and 50% by NTPC
Ltd of India. Debt is proposed to cover 70% of the capital cost. All of the
debt financing would be provided by loans from the Indian Export Import Bank.
The estimated Capital Structure of Rampal Power Plant (US$ m) is given below:
Table 3: Estimated
Capital Structure of Rampal Power Plant
Capital Structure
|
US$ m
|
Split
|
Split
|
US$ m
|
Local currency
|
112
|
|||
Foreign currency
|
1,488
|
|||
Indian ImEx Bank - Buyer's Credit Facility
|
1,600
|
|||
Buffer?
|
210
|
|||
Debt required
|
1,390
|
70%
|
1,390
|
|
NTPC Ltd of India
|
298
|
50%
|
||
BPDB of Bangladesh
|
298
|
50%
|
||
Total Equity
|
596
|
30%
|
596
|
|
Total cost (US$ m)
|
1,986
|
Source: Project Documents, Institute for Energy Economics and
Financial Analysis (IEEFA) Estimate
Q.
Who will be the guarantor of the loan & how the profit & loss will be
shared?
A. Government of
Bangladesh (GoB) is the Guarantor of the loan. In case the project incurs
losses, burden will remain with the BPDB and GoB nothing with NTPC or India.
Exim Bank of India will reap all benefits being a lender. If the project is
delayed GoB will have to pay extra cost for it. If there is any profit it will
be equally shared by both BPDB and NTPC.
Q.
Who will run the management?
A.
During the entire construction period top Management (CEO, CTO, COO, CFO) &
Project Management (PD) Teams will be manned by the NTPC personnel. Bangladesh
will hold the position of Chairman of Board of Directors. In such case it might
be difficult to ensure accountability and transparency of the top and project
management teams. In order to ensure accountability and transparency both top
and project management teams should have been selected and hired through
international advertisement. As the EPC contractor and the management teams
both are from the same country, it might be difficult to ensure quality, cost
and timely completion of the project.
Q:
Are some costs hidden in the Economic Analysis?
A:
Yes, according to IEEFA some costs are hidden and it is worth of USD 3 billion.
The GoB will give tax free to NTPC for 15 years worth of US$ 936 million. The
BPDB will bear the cost of annual maintenance of worth US$26 million annually
for 25 years, totaling to the tune of US$ 650 million. The Exim Bank
India will provide a subsidy of US$ 988 million, a total of US$ 2.574 million.
If all these costs are included, both the COE and Levellized Tariff will increase.
Q: What are the interest
rate and discounting rate shown in the FS?
A: The rate of interest has been shown as 14% and
discounting rate as 12%. Under the terms of the EXIM Bank, the total loan would
be paid within 20 years and the regular repayments will start after 7 years. The
rate of interest is high for such a large-scale project, if compared with
others. For example, rate of interest of JICA financing for Matarbari Coal
Power Plant is 0.1% and the repayment period is 40 (30+10) yrs. In case of
Chinese fund, rate of interest is less than 2% and the repayment period 18
(15+3) years. Even in case of Chinese commercial loan rate of interest is 3 to
3.5% and the repayment period 12 yrs (10+2).
Moreover, the burden of
the total loan will be on Bangladesh though the ownership of the project is
said to be shared (fifty-fifty) between the two countries. The Government
of Bangladesh will be bound to give the ‘guarantee’ of this total amount of
loan. That means, if - (a) the project will face any loss (b) the project will
be stopped in the midway of implementation (c) there is any failure in terms of
installment payment, the Bangladesh Govt. will be solely responsible to repay
the loan.
Q: Is the quality of
coal defined? What will be annual coal
requirement?
A: From the FS, it is found that assumption is
made on the basis of Indonesian coal having Gross Calorific Value (GCV) 6000
kcal/kg, max ash content 15% and max. Sulphur content 0.6%. In EIA source of
coal has been shown as Indonesia, Australia and South Africa. Coal quality will
have quite good impact on COE and Tariff.
Table 4: Quality of the
Coal Available in Selected Source Country
GCV (Kcal/kg)
|
TM (% Max)
|
IM (% Max)
|
Ash (% Max)
|
VM (%)
|
FC (%)
|
TS (% Max)
|
HGI
|
Sizing (mm)
|
AFT Deg. C (Max)
|
ADB
|
AR
|
ADB
|
ADB
|
ADB
|
ADB
|
||||
For Indonesian Sources
|
|||||||||
5500 -5800
|
26-42
|
15-20
|
5-10
|
38-44
|
By diff.
|
0.5 - <1
|
42-60
|
50
|
1100-1250
|
For Australian Sources
|
|||||||||
6100 -7250
|
6.0 -18.5
|
1.0-13.5
|
8.7 - 21.0
|
19-50
|
By diff.
|
0.2 - 1.0
|
37 -82
|
50
|
1300 - 1600
|
For South African Sources
|
|||||||||
6100-6500
|
8 -12
|
3-5
|
15
|
20 – 22
|
By diff.
|
0-1.0
|
45-70
|
50
|
1200-1300
|
Source: EIA Report
Note: ADB: Air Dried
Basis; AR: As received; GCV: General Calorific Value; TM: Total Moisture; IM:
Inherent Moisture; VM: Volatile Matter; FC: Fixed Carbon; TS: Total Sulfur;
HGI: Hard-grove Grind-ability Index; AFT: Ash fusion temperature (flow temp. in
a reducing atmosphere), By Difference: 100- (IM + Ash + VM).
The daily coal
requirement of 2x 660 MW units shall be about 12,920 tones based on GCV of 6000
Kcal/kg, 100% plant load factor and 2,447 Kcal/kWh unit heat rate. The coal
requirement will be less with coal of higher GCV value. Coal requirement has
been estimated using the formula:
Annual Coal Requirement:
(2,447 Kcal/KWh x 1320 MW x 24 hours x 365 days) / 6000 kcal/kg = 4.715 million
ton.
Q: How are hazards and risks assessed?
A: Hazard and risk assessment is important for any
energy related industries. The proposed project may have mechanical risk from
turbine and generator; electrical risk from power transformer, switchyard, 400
KV and 230 KV switchyard control room, transmission line; risk of fire and
explosion from boiler, live steam line, and fuel stockpile; risk of
toxic/carcinogenic chemical exposure from chemical storage and accidental
discharge of sulfuric acid from SOx absorber. In addition, some hazards may be
resulted from malfunctioning of machinery and equipments like filter, ESP, air
pollution control devices, air circulating system of boiler, lightning
arrestor, safe working place, etc. To lessen these risks, required specific
measures have been identified in EIA report. The project may possess
occupational health risk. Hazards and risk related to shipping and barging
activities for coal transportation may also occur.
Q: What are the emissions from coal power plants?
A: Main emissions from coal fired thermal power
plants are CO2, NOx, SOx, and air-borne inorganic particles such as fly ash,
carbonaceous material (filth), suspended particulate matter (SPM), and other
trace gas species. The emissions per unit of electricity are estimated to be in
the range of 0.91 to 0.95 kg/kWh for CO2, 6.94 to 7.20 g/kWh for SO2, and 4.22
to 4.38 g/kWh for NO. In EIA report Resultant Impact on Plant Emission on Air
Quality of Sundarban is presented as below:
Table 5: Summary of
Resultant Impact of Plant Emission on Air Quality of Sundarbans
Emission
|
Emission contribution
of from each unit (24 hr avg.)
|
Emission contribution
of from two units (24 hr avg.)
|
Concentration in
ambient air *24 hr avg.) near Sundarbans
|
Resultant
concentration in air (24 hr avg.) near Sundarbans
|
M0EF’s Standard (ECR
1997)
|
SOx
|
21.2 ìg/m3
|
42.4 ìg/m3
|
8-11 ìg/m3
|
50.4-53.4 ìg/m3
|
80 ìg/m3
|
NOx
|
15.6 ìg/m3
|
31.2 ìg/m3
|
16-20 ìg/m3
|
72.2-51.2 ìg/m3
|
80 ìg/m3
|
SPM
|
100 ìg/m3
|
200 ìg/m3
|
.......
|
........
|
100 ìg/nm3
|
CO
|
200 ìg/nm3
|
||||
Sulfuric Acid
|
50 ìg/nm3
|
However, the resultant
impact of emission from all the industries, existing and proposed at Mongla and
Sundarban areas will create higher level of emission, which cannot be
tolerable. According to EIA concentration of Sulfur in the ambient-air of
Sundarban will be more than 50ìg/NM3, exceeding the
limit for National Heritage sites (30ìg/NM3).
Q: How do the combustion (burning) processes in
a coal power plant affect the emission of pollutants?
A: The combustion process of the grinded coal in
the boiler is a complicated non-linear event. The pollutants emitted from
thermal power plants depend largely upon the characteristics of the fuel
burned, temperature of the furnace, actual air used, and any additional devices
to control the emissions. Currently, electrostatic precipitator (ESP) is used
in thermal power plants to control the emission of fly ash (SPM). Some new
plants use low NOx burners for high temperature (> 1500 K) combustion
technologies and dry/wet SO2 scrubber, if chimney height is less than 275
meters. Mass emission factors for CO2, SO2, and nitric oxide (NO) are computed
based on the input data, such as chemical composition of the coal used at the
power plants and the actual air used during combustion. These calculations are
based on theoretical ideals and do not look over for the control devices.
Q: What is the
significance of emission control?
A: Technologies used for controlling SO2 and NOx
often consume energy and can reduce the overall efficiency of a power plant.
The level of SO2 and NOx control differs per country, depending e.g. on
national emission limits. Countries with high levels of SO2 and NOx control may
have lower efficiencies than they would have had if SO2 and NOx control is not
applied. In case of failure, any protective measure will result in increasing
the pollution in and around Sunderban which is sufficient to destroy the
Sunderban ecology.
Q: What is the impact of
coal transportation?
A: As per FS, for the Rampal plant daily coal
requirement will be 12.920 Tons and annual coal requirement will be 4.715
million Tons. The imported coal to fuel the plant would be transported to the
region on ocean-going ships. The ships would be anchored at Akram Point, which
is located within the Sundarbans. Transshipment from these larger ships to
smaller covered barges would also occur at Akram Point. Coal would be taken
from there on the Passur River to the Rampal project site, “making a total of
400-500 trips per year directly through the Sundarbans.” BIFPCL would need to
conduct dredging and widening of a 36-kilometre stretch of the Passur River to
make the river navigable between Akram Point and the project site. Coal
transportation and continuous dredging of the river flowing through Sundarban
will affect the flora and fauna, specially the aquatic faunal species, by
creating air pollution, water pollution and noise pollution. Coal
transportation is enough to destroy ecology of Sundarban.
Q: What is the overall
impact of Rampal project on the ecology of the Sundarbans?
A: The proposed power plant is 14 km away from the
Sundarbans Mangrove Ecosystem. The combination of various types of ecosystem
(forest, coastal and wetland) makes the Sundarbans a home to several uniquely
adapted aquatic and terrestrial flora and fauna with many threatened species.
The World Heritage Site of Sundarbans is 70 km away from the proposed plant
location. The following issues are necessary to be considered in order to
examine the overall impact of Rampal project on the ecology of Sundarbans. By
recognizing the impact of the project on these ecological factors, almost all
of them have been selected as IEC to identify and to assess impact of proposed
project on them.
Habitat
Habitat health and
diversity are very important for ecosystem. Different construction activities
may have impact on habitat due to disposal of waste and waste water, alteration
of existing landscape, increase of anthropogenic activities, etc. Emissions of
greenhouse gases, NOx, Heat, etc from power plant may have impact on
surrounding ecosystem habitat, which depend on the emission rate and nature.
Terrestrial flora
The potential impact on
terrestrial flora of riverside, roadside, homestead and agricultural land is
related to the site clearance activities, construction activities during
implementation phase, open-air coal storage facilities, management of coal
dust, fly ash etc. Smaller plants (herbs, shrubs) are sensitive to change of
their surroundings.
Terrestrial fauna
Different species of
frog, amphibians, reptiles, mammals, are found within the project area and they
are also under the threat of extinction due to the devastating impacts of the
plant.
Aquatic flora
Aquatic flora including
planktonic community is a good indicator of ecological health. The aquatic
flora and planktonic community of the river and adjoining freshwater sources
may be affected due to changes in water quality.
Aquatic fauna
The proposed coal-fired
plant is located close to the major river Passur. This river is notified as
regular roaming ground of endangered aquatic mammal – the Ganges River dolphin
and Estuarine Crocodile. The river also serves as the migratory route for many anadromous
species. Hilsa is a well know anadromous fish species. Among reptiles
like Dog-faced water snake (Cerberus rhynchops), White-bellied snake (Fordonialeucobalia),
critically endangered Estuarine River Terrapin (Batagurbaska) are few of
the known anadromous animals. These faunal species may have face the
risk of destruction of their habitats and breeding grounds.
Benthic community
Generally, benthic
communities are very sensitive to waste water discharge, thermal plume,
dredging operation, pollution from ships etc. Species composition of the river
may be changed due to any change in river water quality, heat gradient, etc.
Bengal Tiger and Deer
Bengal tiger is a
globally threatened species and the spotted deer is the major prey of tiger.
The existing navigational route in Passur River will be used for transporting
coal for the proposed power plant. The vessel movement and sound pollution from
vessel would create disturbance (feeding/ grazing, breeding, movement etc.) for
the tiger and deer.
Crocodile
Estuarial crocodile is
also found in Sundarbans mangrove forest’s river and estuaries. The movement of
ships through the rivers and creeks inside the Sundarbans, oil spills, and
sound from vessel may create disturbance (feeding territory, breeding behavior,
roosting and basking habitat) for such aquatic reptiles.
Dolphin community
The Passur River is an
important habitat for Dolphin. Bangladesh has established three new wildlife
sanctuaries for endangered freshwater dolphins in the Sundarbans. Officially
declared on January 29, 2012, the sanctuaries are intended to protect the last
two remaining species of freshwater dolphins in Asia - the Ganges River dolphin
and the Irrawaddy dolphin. The habitat and breeding place of this dolphin
community would have been affected by the coal transportation activities.
Invasive species
Invasive species may
become very harmful for ecosystem and its community. In general, maritime
vessels may carry invasive species. The proposed project includes maritime
transportation of coal from different international sources (Australia,
Indonesia and South Africa).
Ambient air
Land filling, site
establishment, earth works, construction materials processing, construction
activities, vehicle movement, etc. may generate fugitive dust particles. The
proposed project involves construction activities like civil construction,
mechanical construction, handling and stocking of construction materials, etc.
It is necessary to adopt management plan for controlling the fugitive
particulate matter during construction activities.
Emission of greenhouse gases
Carbon dioxide and
nitrogen oxides may be emitted from combustion of the petroleum products in
project related vehicles, machinery, generators, and vessels/barges etc during
the construction period. This impact may further be minimized by adopting
Environmental Management Plan.
Ambient noise
Operation of different
machineries and equipments for construction activities, running of heavy load
traffic for construction materials transportation, and regular traffic movement
may generate noise during construction period. The produced noise may have impact
on existing acoustic environment of rural category defined in ECR, 1997. Local
inhabitants may feel disturbed due to noise from line sources (traffic
movement).
Waste generation and disposal
Construction activities
may generate different categories of solid wastes and might have impact on
local environment only if not managed properly. Wastes may be generated from
earth works, site establishment, civil construction, stockpile of materials,
and domestic household activities. The wastes might be metals, concrete,
spoiled construction material, excavated spoils, spilled oil from machinery and
vehicles, etc. The EIA also suggests different management plan as EMP for
controlling generation and scattered disposal of wastes. If EMP is properly
implemented, there might be only some minor local and short term impact of
waste disposal on physical environmental resources i.e. water, land resources
and agriculture.
Water bodies and water resources
During pre-construction
phase the environmental quality of water resources may not be impacted
significantly, as there will be no activities on water resources except some
navigation for site visit. The construction activities and installation of
power plants may cause changes in the surface water and ground water quality
and potential. Little drawdown of local groundwater table may be noticed in dry
season due to withdrawing of groundwater for construction activities. In the
project area, lowest ground water table occurs during April-May. Therefore, it
is necessary to initiate proper management plan for limiting the use of
groundwater during dry season. However, the problem of this phenomenon will be
short term and consequences of this problem might not be significant as there
is no hand pump tube well within 1km of the project.
Surface Water Quality
Oil spillage from the
workshop, water vessel may contaminate surface water near the construction
site.
Impacts of dredging activities
Dredging operation may
increase turbidity of water at dredging locations. If the dredgers cannot be
managed properly, water quality of river may be contaminated by spillage of
oil, grease and effluent from dumping site. Dumping of dredged material and
seepage from dumped dredged material may also increase the turbidity of river
water at project site. Nevertheless, the dredging may improve navigability of
the Passur River. The implementing agency should be responsible for taking
necessary measures for mitigation of impact.
Fish Habitat
The only direct impact
during pre-construction phase is acquisition of agricultural cum shrimp
aquaculture area. Acquired land includes shrimp aquaculture farm, mangrove,
intertidal area, and tidal creeks which are used as, fish habitat. Construction
work including land filling by dredging, sand lifting, site clearance and
physical construction of plant setup etc. which may have impacts on open water
fish habitats, fish diversity and hence on fish production.
Fish Migration
The Passur, Chunkuri and
Maidara rivers are the main channels for open water fish migration. All the
migratory fishes move inward and seaward for their biological needs (e.g.
spawning, feeding). Navigational activities for transporting construction
materials through existing navigation route and dredging activities may result
minor disturbance to fish migration. Only during the dredging operation, fish
migration may be disturbed within the dredging operation area.
Fish Production
The only direct impact
of land acquisition would be loss of culture fish production from the acquired
shrimp aquaculture. The loss may stand up to a maximum of 564 tons annually.
This impact may be limited only within the project boundary. There may not be
any loss of capture fish from the Passur and Maidara rivers during construction
period. Only during dredging operation, local fisher may notice less catch from
the dredging operation area and its close proximity.
Q. Does the Rampal Coal
Power Project adhere to the Equator Principles (EP)?
A. The Equator Principles (EP) are understood to
be the minimum standard for responsible investment and management of
environmental and social risk in the project finance sector. The Rampal coal
plant fails to comply with even the minimum environmental and social norms
established by the Equator Principles.
The Rampal coal plant is
in Category A, with irreversible adverse impacts. Category A, the highest level
of risk, is assigned to a project if it is known to pose “potential significant
adverse environmental and social risks and/or impacts that are diverse,
irreversible or unprecedented.”
An Environmental and
Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) is required for all Category A projects.
Further, the assessment is required to be “an adequate, accurate and objective
evaluation and presentation of the environmental and social risks and impacts,
whether prepared by the client, consultants or external experts.” Assessment
documentation “should propose measures to minimise, mitigate, and offset
adverse impacts in a manner relevant and appropriate to the nature and scale of
the proposed Project.” The assessment process and documentation for the Rampal
coal plant falls far short of these minimum requirements under Principle 2.
Under EP - 3, the
borrower’s assessment process must address compliance with “relevant host
country laws, regulations and permits that pertain to environmental and social
issues”. The Rampal plant involves violations of key pieces of legislations
such as the Environmental Conservation Regulation 1997 (ACR 1997), the
Environment Conservation Act 1995, and the Forest Act 1927. Under Bangladesh’s
Forest Act 1927 and Section 5 (1) of the Environment Conservation Act 1995, the
Ministry of Forestry and Environment has established a protected buffer area of
10 kilometers in width around the entire perimeter of the Sundarbans Reserve
Forest. This protective zone is designated as an Ecologically Critical Area
(ECA) and Industries or projects that cause soil, water, air and noise
pollution to these areas are prohibited. The outer perimeter of the ECA around
the Sundarbans is located just 4 kilometers from the Rampal coal plant, raising
concerns about potential adverse impacts within the ECA itself.
Importantly, EP 4
requires that “the level of detail and complexity of the ESMP and the priority
of the identified measures and actions will be commensurate with the Project’s
potential risks and impacts.” No evidence has been found that an ESMS or an
ESMP has been prepared for this project. If correct, this is a clear violation
of Equator Principle 4.
The Principle - 5
requires that the consultation process be “tailored” to the risks and impacts
of the Project and should be “free from external manipulation, interference,
coercion and intimidation.” The Rampal coal plant has grossly violated each of
these Equator Principle 5 requirements.
The Principle 6
stipulates establishment of a grievance mechanism “designed to receive and
facilitate resolution of concerns and grievances about the Project’s
environmental and social performance” in all Category A projects. There is no
evidence that an accessible, legitimate, and functioning grievance mechanism
has been established to address and resolve the concerns of people who have
been harmed by the forcible acquisition of land and other resources that
formerly sustained them.
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