By David Bergman / The Wire
Sajeeb Wazed, the US-based son of
Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has taken time off from his frequent
Facebook musings about the country’s politics to pen an article in the
Washington Times defending the arrest in Bangladesh of opposition journalist
Shafiq Rehman for his involvement in an alleged plot to kill him in the US.
The article also seeks to connect
this ‘plot’ directly to violent protests by the opposition Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) in early 2015 and to defend the government’s arrest of
thousands of opposition party activists and leaders.
In setting out his stall in
support of the Bangladeshi government’s action, Wazed, however, omits
significant facts and makes a number of inaccurate statements.
A ‘plot to kill’?
Rehman was arrested five weeks
ago on charges of being involved in a plot to kill Wazed in the US. Another
opposition journalist, already in detention, was also ‘shown arrested’ for this
offence. The high court on Tuesday refused to give them bail.
The Washington Times article
connects the arrest of the journalist in Bangladesh to a criminal prosecution
in the US last year that resulted in a US-Bangladesh citizen, Rizvi Ahmed,
pleading guilty of bribing an FBI agent to obtain confidential information about
Wazed.
Wazed states that Ahmed sought
the information from the FBI agent so that he could ‘scare,’ ‘kidnap’ and
‘hurt’ him, and that this information was given or sold to Rehman who also
sought to do the same.
However, Wazed’s reporting of
this US federal prosecution is inaccurate and highly partial.
First, he does not mention in his
article that the key documents sought and obtained by Ahmed concerned alleged
financial irregularities by the prime minister’s son himself.
According to the US Department of
Justice’s sentencing report, in December 2011 in exchange for $1000 – the only
money that was given to the corrupt FBI agent – Ahmed received a number of
confidential documents about Wazed including “an internal memorandum (the ‘FBI
Memo’) that referred to Individual 1 and a sum of $300 million, and a
confidential report, known as a Suspicious Activity Report (the ‘SAR’) that
also referred to Individual 1.”
Individual 1 refers to Wazed.
Banks or financial institutions are required to file a SAR report when they
identify any suspicious financial transactions.
According to the Department of
Justice submission, on receiving this document, Ahmed was particularly
interested in getting more information about the ‘$300 million’.
In a text, quoted in the US court
submission, Ahmed writes to the accomplice of the FBI agent, “Just give me some
idea what exactly you have on them … The last documents you gave me about $300
millions. How far that investigation went n what they found. Give me some idea
and I will get u that contract!!!” (sic). (The ‘contract’ relates to ongoing
discussions about Ahmed paying further money to the FBI agent and his friend
for further information.)
Secondly, Wazed also omits in his
article any mention of the US federal judge’s ruling, which dismissed the
department of justice’s contention, raised during the sentencing hearing, that
another objective Rizve had was to ‘scare,’ ‘kidnap’ and ‘hurt’ him.
“The [US] government’s contention
that [Rizve] Ahmed in fact sought to kidnap and physically harm an individual
is a stretch,” Judge Vincent L. Briccetti had said.
“I just don’t feel there’s enough
evidence that’s been presented to me for me to make that finding,” he had
added.
“This case,” the US judge had
said, “is all about furthering Ahmed’s political aims, getting confidential
information to expose what Ahmed apparently thought was corrupt behavior by the
ruling party and otherwise embarrass [Sajeeb Wazed].”
A case against Rehman?
Ignoring all of this, Wazed seeks
in his article to link Rehman to the ‘plot’ to kill him by pointing out that a
copy of the same FBI documents that Ahmed had corruptly purchased were found in
his house. The documents, he says, “chillingly included my home and office
addresses, my day-to-day movements and even the license plate number of my
car.”
Wazed’s article though does not
state that the ‘documents’ found in Rehman’s house comprise the FBI memo
relating to him that mention ‘$300 million’ and the SAR – which any journalist,
particularly one linked to the political opposition, would love to get their
hands on.
The most reasonable and obvious
explanation as to why Rehman had a copy of these documents is that he hoped to
use the financial information they contained to expose Wazed’s allegedly
corrupt behavior – not to use it to track down and kill him.
Indeed, if it were true that
Rehman – or Ahmed himself – was involved in a plot to kill Wazed, what
evidence is there that after receiving this information, either of them took
any action of any kind to further that intention?
There is none.
The BNP and the 2014 elections
In his article, Wazed then seeks
to link the alleged ‘plot’ to kill him with violent protests orchestrated by
the BNP, one year after the controversial January 2014 elections. In doing so,
he makes an inaccurate claim about why the BNP chose not to take part in these
elections.
He says the party “chose to quit
rather than contest” the elections as it realised it would have been “soundly
defeated”. However, such a contention is not supported by the
international-standard polls that were undertaken at the time, which in fact
showed that the BNP had a good chance of winning any elections conducted freely
and fairly.
In January 2013, a Democracy
International (DI) poll found that 38% of voters would vote for the BNP against
32% for the Awami League; in July 2013, another DI poll found that BNP’s
support had increased to 43% among voters, with the Awami League staying at
32%. Another poll conducted just after the elections found that preferences had
changed and Awami League had a lead of 4% (within the margin of error).
The International Republican
Institute published polls do not include data on voting preferences, but they
do provide information on people’s views concerning whether the country was
heading in the right or the wrong direction, often used as an indicator of
voter preference.
These showed that in November
2013, a couple of months before the election, 62% thought that the country was
going in the wrong direction and 33% in the right direction. At the time of the
election, the polls showed a very similar result, 59% to 35%.
The only poll published before
the elections that suggested that the Awami League was doing well – with a 6%
lead – was one commissioned by the party itself and undertaken by a polling
agency owned by an Awami League member of parliament. Moreover, a different
interpretation of the same data put the BNP ahead by 3%.
Significantly, Wazed also fails
to mention the crucial reason why the opposition parties did not take part in
the 2014 election – the Awami League government’s decision to remove provisions
from the Constitution that required the establishment of a pre-election neutral
caretaker government to ensure that the elections would be free and fair.
Ironically, it was successful protests by the Awami League twenty years earlier
when it was in opposition that had resulted in the caretaker government
provision first being enacted.
BNP violence: “Without prejudice
or favour?”
Wazed was correct to criticise
the opposition party’s “violent” response to these controversial January 2014
‘elections’ (which resulted in over half of the parliamentary seats remaining
uncontested and the other half uncompetitive).
And he is right to claim that it
was perfectly legitimate for the Bangladesh authorities to seek to arrest those
responsible.
However, this was not done
“without prejudice or favour,” as he claims.
The police filed hundreds of
criminal cases, each one filed against dozens of named BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami
activists and supporters chosen mainly because they were from the area where a
violent incident took place – without any proper evidence of their involvement
in the crime. Those named were then arrested and detained for months, with
charges subsequently raised against them.
Moreover, many of the criminal
cases also included a statement by the police that the violent offence was also
committed by dozens or hundreds of ‘unnamed’ people. This allowed any BNP or
Jamaat activist, otherwise not named in a case, to be subsequently detained and
‘shown arrested’ as one of these unnamed accused. As a result, Bangladesh’s law
authorities have arrested thousands of opposition activists.
In addition to the arrests there
were also many extra judicial killings by the police – in fact, a third of the
total deaths during the 2015 violence involved opposition activists or pickets
killed whilst in the custody of law enforcement bodies, during alleged
‘shoot-outs’, during protests or in incidents where it has been alleged law
enforcement authorities were responsible.
At the end of his article, in
criticising human rights organisations and the international media who condemn
Bangladesh, Wazed asks rhetorically: “Should criminals not be arrested because
they belong to rival political parties?”
Clearly, “criminals” should not
escape prosecution simply because they belong to a particular political party.
However, what has been going on
in Bangladesh is that hundreds of people are being arrested simply because they
belong to rival political parties – even though there is no credible evidence
that they have committed any offences.
And this is the real link that
ties the 2015 violence and the alleged ‘plot to kill’ the prime minister’s son.
They both have provided pretexts
to arrest opposition supporters and activists.
David Bergman is an investigative
journalist based in Bangladesh. He also runs the Bangladesh Politico and
Bangladesh War Crimes blogs, and tweets @davidbangladesh.
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